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FOREWORD
Hezbollah’s conduct of its 2006 campaign in southern Lebanon has become an increasingly important case
for the U.S. defense debate. Some see the future of warfare as one of nonstate opponents employing irregular methods, and advocate a sweeping transformation
of the U.S. military to meet such threats. Others point
to the 2006 campaign as an example of a nonstate actor
nevertheless waging a state-like conventional war, and
argue that a more traditional U.S. military posture is
needed to deal with such enemies in the future.
This monograph, by Dr. Stephen Biddle of the
Council on Foreign Relations and Mr. Jeffrey Friedman,
Harvard Kennedy School of Government, seeks to
inform this debate by examining in detail Hezbollah’s
conduct of the 2006 campaign. The authors use evidence
collected from a series of 36 primary source interviews
with Israeli participants in the fighting who were in a
position to observe Hezbollah’s actual behavior in the
field in 2006, coupled with deductive inference from
observable Hezbollah behavior in the field to findings
for their larger strategic intent for the campaign.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on this important topic.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The future of nonstate military actors is a central
issue for U.S. strategy and defense planning. It
is widely believed that such combatants will be
increasingly common opponents for the U.S. military,
and many now advocate sweeping change in U.S.
military posture to prepare for this—the debate over
the associated agenda for “low-tech” or irregular
warfare transformation is quickly becoming one of the
central issues for U.S. defense policy and strategy. As a
prominent recent example of a nonstate actor fighting
a Westernized state, Hezbollah’s 2006 campaign
thus offers a window into a kind of warfare that is
increasingly central to the defense debate in the United
States. And the case’s implications for U.S. policy have
already become highly controversial.
Some see Hezbollah as an essentially terrorist
organization using an information age version of
the asymmetric military methods seen as typical of
nonstate actors historically. This view of Hezbollah
as an information age guerrilla force strengthens
the case for a major redesign of the U.S. military to
reposition it for irregular warfare. Its advocates differ
in the particulars, but most would expand the Army
and Marine Corps; reequip this larger ground force
with lighter weapons and vehicles; restructure it to
deemphasize traditional armor and artillery in favor
of light infantry, civil affairs, military police, military
advisor, and special forces capability; and reengineer
training, doctrine, Service culture, recruitment, and
promotion systems to stress low-intensity irregular
warfare skills and methods rather than conventional
combat. And major changes in the interagency process
would be needed to replace a balkanized, slow-moving
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decisionmaking system with one agile and integrated
enough to compete effectively with politically nimble,
media savvy opponents in portraying the results of
such warfare persuasively to public audiences overseas.
If so, the needed changes in the defense program
would be extremely expensive. Many would pay for
this by scaling back or abandoning hi-tech air and
naval modernization programs; reducing the size of the
Air Force and oceangoing Navy; and cutting back the
ground forces’ training and preparation for conventional war fighting. The result would be a very different
American military and defense establishment—from its
size to its structure, equipment, people, and doctrine.
Others, however, see Hezbollah’s 2006 campaign
as a major departure from the asymmetric methods of
traditional terrorists or guerrillas and as a shift toward
the conventional military methods normally associated
with state actors. What is new in this account is how
much the 2006 campaign differed from terrorist or
guerrilla warfare—information age or not—and how
conventional and state-like the fighting was. This view
of Hezbollah as a conventional army weakens the case
for irregular warfare transformation. Instead it implies
that a conventionally structured military is actually
better suited for a future of nonstate opponents than
low-tech transformation advocates claim. Where
capabilities for low intensity combat can be improved
without undermining conventional performance this
would always be wise, but many in this camp see
sharp tradeoffs between the forces and training needed
for irregular as opposed to conventional combat; if so,
then radical transformation would be ill-advised and
traditional force structures, doctrines, and training are
a better course for the future.
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The authors argue in this monograph that neither of
these schools’ interpretations is completely consistent
with Hezbollah’s actual conduct of the 2006 campaign,
but that the latter is closer than the former. Hezbollah in
2006 used methods very different from those commonly
associated with “guerrilla,” “terrorist,” or “irregular”
warfare in important respects: it put too much emphasis
on holding ground; it sought concealment chiefly via
terrain rather than through civilian intermingling; its
forces were too concentrated; and it appears to have
articulated a differentiated theater of war for the
purpose of defending rocket launch sites to be used in a
strategic bombing campaign against Israeli population
centers.
But neither did Hezbollah approximate a pure
conventional extreme: its defense of ground was too
yielding; it relied too extensively on harassing fires
and unattended minefields; it put too much emphasis
on coercion; and it may have disposed its forces too
much in accordance with the population’s political
orientation, all of which are traits commonly associated
with “irregular,” or “guerrilla” forces.
Hezbollah’s methods were thus somewhere between the popular conceptions of guerrilla and conventional warfare—but so are most military actors’, whether
state or nonstate. Few real militaries have ever conformed perfectly to either the “conventional” or the
“guerrilla” extreme. The commonplace tendency to see
guerrilla and conventional methods as a stark dichotomy and to associate the former with nonstate actors and
the latter with states is a mistake and has been so for at
least a century. In fact, there are profound elements of
“guerrilla” methods in the military behavior of almost
all state militaries in conventional warfare, from tactics
all the way through strategy. And most nonstate
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guerrilla organizations have long used tactics and
strategies that most observers tend to associate with
state military behavior. In reality, there is a continuum
of methods between the polar extremes of the Maginot
Line and the Viet Cong, and most real-world cases
have always fallen somewhere in between. The 2006
Lebanon campaign, too, fell somewhere in between.
Its placement on this continuum, however, is much
further from the Viet Cong end of the scale than many
low-tech transformation advocates would expect for
a nonstate actor—and, in fact, the biggest divergence
between Hezbollah’s methods and those of modern
Western militaries may well be Hezbollah’s imperfect
proficiency of execution rather than the doctrine they
were trying to execute.
Hezbollah did some things well, such as its use
of cover and concealment, its preparation of fighting
positions, its fire discipline and mortar marksmanship,
and its coordination of direct fire support. But it also
fell far short of contemporary Western standards
in controlling large-scale maneuver, integrating
movement and indirect fire support, combining
multiple combat arms, reacting flexibly to changing
conditions, and small-arms marksmanship. Hezbollah
appears to have attempted a remarkably conventional
system of tactics and theater operational art, but there
is a difference between trying and achieving, and in
2006 at least, Hezbollah’s reach in some ways exceeded
its grasp.
Yet Hezbollah is hardly alone in this. Many state
actors have fallen far short of Western standards
of military proficiency, both in today’s world and
historically. Saddam’s “elite” Iraqi state Republican
Guard, for example, proved systematically incapable
of integrating movement and indirect fire support,

xiv

combining multiple combat arms, reacting flexibly to
changing conditions, or consistently hitting targets
with either small or large caliber weapons; in two wars
with the United States, the Iraqi state military’s use of
cover and concealment, combat position preparation,
and fire discipline were consistently far less proficient
than Hezbollah’s. The Italian state military in 1941
proved much less proficient in conventional warfare
than did Hezbollah in 2006; French defenses on the critical Sedan front in 1940 were more exposed, and no more
able to react to changing conditions than Hezbollah’s.
The Egyptian state military proved systematically less
adept than Hezbollah in cover and concealment, and
little better than Hezbollah in coordinating large scale
maneuver with combined arms or flexibly responding
to changing conditions in 1956 or 1967; the Syrian state
military did no better in 1967, 1973, or 1982. In fact,
Hezbollah inflicted more Israeli casualties per Arab
fighter in 2006 than did any of Israel’s state opponents
in the 1956, 1967, 1973, or 1982 Arab-Israeli interstate
wars. Hezbollah’s skills in conventional warfighting
were clearly imperfect in 2006—but they were also
well within the observed bounds of other state
military actors in the Middle East and elsewhere, and
significantly superior to many such states.
In all, then, Hezbollah’s behavior in 2006 conformed to neither an ideal model of “guerrilla” warfare nor
one of “conventional” warfighting, but its approach
and proficiency nonetheless place it well within a band
that has characterized many past state militaries in
interstate conflicts.
This, however, poses serious challenges for U.S.
policymakers in light of the tension between the
implications of the 2006 Lebanon campaign and the
demands of Iraq and Afghanistan. Ongoing operations
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in Iraq and Afghanistan demand maximum capability
for defeating current enemies who practice a close
approximation of classical guerrilla warfare; Lebanon
suggests a possibility for future enemies who could
wage war more conventionally than this. The different
demands of these different styles of fighting thus leave
defense planners with a dilemma: the United States
cannot simultaneously maximize its potential for both,
but neither prospect can safely be ignored, requiring a
painful choice in which something important must be
sacrificed whichever choice one makes.
By contrast, many in today’s future warfare debate
see a simpler, less conflicted picture. It is widely argued
that the future is one of nonstate opponents who will
use asymmetric, irregular methods much like those of
today’s Iraqi or Afghan insurgents. If so, then there is
little or no real, meaningful risk in transforming the
U.S. military around the needs of the guerrilla end of
the behavioral spectrum. On the contrary, this would
unambiguously improve U.S. national security by
reshaping the military to meet the real needs of the
future, finally shedding the inherited baggage of a Cold
War force whose bureaucratic inertia had thwarted
needed change until now. If the future really is one of
nonstate actors waging an information age version of
classical guerrilla warfare, then the defense planning
challenge of today and tomorrow is a politically
demanding but intellectually straightforward matter
of pushing hard enough to get a resistant bureaucracy
to do the right thing and accept as much irregular
warfare transformation as it can be made to swallow.
The Lebanon experience, however, suggests a future of less clarity and more diversity. Lebanon in 2006
shows us a concrete example of a nonstate actor whose
military behavior was far from the classical guerrilla
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model seen in today’s Iraq and Afghanistan. And Hezbollah in 2006 is unlikely to be the last of these—although a careful study of the range of nonstate military
behavior is beyond the scope of this monograph, there
is reason to believe that similar experience has been
observed in recent decades in conflicts such as Chechnya,
Slovenia, Bosnia, Croatia, Rwanda, and in actions such
as Bai Beche or the Shah-i-Kot valley in Afghanistan
in 2001-02. It cannot yet be known how broad this
trend may be, what its root causes are, or how far it
will go—to answer these questions is a critical research
requirement for the defense intellectual community.
But Hezbollah does demonstrate, unambiguously,
that even today’s nonstate actors are not limited to the
irregular, guerrilla model military methods so often
assumed in the future warfare debate.
And this means that the defense planning challenge
is more complex than the current debate often implies.
There are real risks both in changing too little and in
changing too much. And to avert failure in Iraq or
Afghanistan may require a real sacrifice in meeting
future challenges elsewhere that cannot be avoided
by ignoring conventional threats or by insisting on
balance. The tradeoffs are real, they are not artificial,
and the dilemmas they create cannot be ducked.
This certainly does not mean that the United States
should return to a preclusive focus on major warfare as
it did before 2003—or that a Hezbollah threat should
replace the Red Army in the Fulda Gap as the focus for
U.S. defense planning. The pre-2003 U.S. military was
seriously underinvested in capabilities for countering
guerrilla methods of the kind we faced increasingly
beginning in 2004. And it would be dangerous and
unwise to return to the pre-2003 focus and accept the
degree of unpreparedness for guerrilla methods this
produced.
xvii

Nor does this analysis imply that we should accept
failure in Iraq or Afghanistan in order to rebalance the
military toward more conventional enemies than we
face there. Failure in either Iraq or Afghanistan could
have grave consequences for U.S. national interests.
Until these theaters are stabilized—or unless stability
becomes infeasible—it will be essential to maximize U.S.
performance in these ongoing wars even if this reduces
future potential for some as-yet unseen war elsewhere. The
analysis of Lebanon above thus does not presuppose
appropriate U.S. policy for Iraq or Afghanistan.
What an analysis of Lebanon can do, however,
is to show the limits of some prominent analyses of
future warfare and to highlight the true dilemmas
associated with defense policy decisionmaking. The
future is not simply one of guerrilla-like warfare by
nonstate actors. And this means that a thoroughgoing
transformation to suit the demands of such warfare has
real risks and real dangers as well as benefits. It may
still be the right policy to shift the U.S. military’s focus
toward guerrilla warfare, especially relative to the pre2003 military’s radical avoidance of this problem. It
may even be the right policy to make a radical shift
toward counterguerrilla proficiency if this is the only
way to avoid defeat in such wars. Or it may not: an
analysis of Lebanon per se cannot establish how much
counterguerrilla capability is enough. But to make this
decision requires a sound understanding of the costs—
as well as the benefits—of all the options. And a true
reoptimization of the military for classical guerrilla
warfare would entail real costs in a world where
Hezbollah-like enemies may become more common
over time. There is no escaping this tradeoff via a
simple projection of a monolithic future threat, and one
need not necessarily be a bureaucratic obstructionist
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to worry about nonguerrilla enemies. What Hezbollah
in 2006 shows is that in defense planning, as in
economics, there is no such thing as a free lunch or an
unambiguous, risk-free policy. The real world is one of
tradeoffs, and all options have downsides—even the
options that look most forward-thinking.
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THE 2006 LEBANON CAMPAIGN
AND THE FUTURE OF WARFARE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMY AND DEFENSE
POLICY
Debates over the nature of future warfare drive
much of U.S. defense planning, from decisions on
force structure to resource allocation, modernization,
joint doctrine, transformation, and the use of force.
And these debates are powerfully influenced by
interpretations of recent combat experience—both
our own, and others’. Middle Eastern cases have been
especially influential in this way. Initial impressions
of the lethality of precision guided antitank weapons
in the 1973 October War, for example, gave powerful
impetus to one of the most sweeping U.S. doctrinal
revisions of the Cold War in the development of the
Army’s Active Defense concept. Accounts of Israeli
effectiveness using new air warfare technology in their
1982 war with Syria proved highly influential in the
genesis of the Revolution in Military Affairs thesis in
the U.S. defense debate.1
1. On the October War and Active Defense, see Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and
the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Ft. Leavenworth, KS:
Leavenworth Paper No. 16, 1988, esp. pp. 29-36; Jonathan M.
House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century, Lawrence,
KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001, pp. 239-240. On the 1982
War and the RMA, see, e.g., Rebecca Grant, “The Bekaa Valley
War,” Air Force Magazine, June 2002, pp. 58-62; Thierry Gongora
and Harald von Riekhoff, “Sizing Up the Revolution in Military
Affairs,” in Thierry Gongora and Harald von Riekhoff, eds., Toward
a Revolution in Military Affairs, Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000, pp.
1-21 at p. 4; Carl Conetta, Charles Knight, and Lutz Unterseher,
Toward Defensive Restructuring in the Middle East, Project on
Defense Alternatives Research Monograph No. 1, February 1991,
section 3.1; Ajay Singh, “Time: The New Dimension in War,” Joint
Force Quarterly, Winter 1995-96, pp. 56-61 at 58, 59.
1

The 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in
Lebanon could prove comparably influential today. A
central issue in today’s debate is the role of nonstate
opponents in defense planning. It is widely believed
that such enemies will be increasingly common in the
future, and many now advocate sweeping change in
U.S. military posture to prepare for this. As a prominent
example of a nonstate actor fighting a Westernized
state, Hezbollah’s 2006 campaign thus offers a window
into a kind of warfare that is increasingly central to U.S.
defense planning.
Much has already been written about this
campaign, especially in Israel, where the issue of
Israeli performance and decisionmaking has both
military and partisan political implications.2 Israel’s
2. E.g., Eliyahu Winograd et al., Final Report, Tel Aviv: The
Inquiry Commission to Examine the Events of the Military Campaign in Lebanon 2006, 2008 [in Hebrew]; Ofer Shelah and Yoav
Limor, Captives in Lebanon, Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2007 [in
Hebrew]; Amir Rapaport, Friendly Fire, Tel Aviv: Ma’ariv, 2007
[in Hebrew]; Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel,
Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008; William M. Arkin, Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006
Israel-Hezbollah War, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University
Press, 2007; Andrew Exum, Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment,
Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006;
David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, Lessons and Implications of the
Israel-Hezbollah War: A Preliminary Assessment, Washington, DC:
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006; Matt M. Matthews,
We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, Ft.
Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 2008;
Shlomo Brom and Meir Elan, eds., The Second Lebanon War: Strategic
Perspectives, Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2007;
Reuven Erlich and Yoram Kahati, Hezbollah as a Case Study of the
Battle for Hearts and Minds, Gelilot: Center for Special Studies/
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2007; Erlich, The
Use of Lebanese Civilians as Human Shields, Gelilot: Center for Special
Studies/Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2006; Uzi
Rubin, The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon
War, Ramat Gan: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2007;
2

conduct of the campaign may also hold important
lessons for the United States.3 But just as important is
the question of Hezbollah per se and its methods. How
Avi Kober, “The Israel Defense Forces and the Second Lebanon
War: Why the Poor Performance?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.
31, No. 1, February 2008, pp. 3-40; Kober, “The Second Lebanon
War,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Perspectives
Paper No. 22, September 2006; Amir Kulick, “Hizbollah vs. the
IDF: The Operational Dimension,” Strategic Assessment, Vol. 9, No.
3, November 2006; Yoaz Hendel, “Failed Tactical Intelligence in
the Lebanon War,” Strategic Assessment, Vol. 9, No. 3, November
2006; Noam Ophir, “Back to Ground Rules: Some Limitations of
Airpower in the Lebanon War,” Strategic Assessment, Vol. 9, No.
2, August 2006; Efraim Inbar, “Strategic Follies: Israel’s Mistakes
in the Second Lebanese War,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic
Studies, Perspectives Paper No. 21, September 2006; Alon BenDavid, “Israel Reflects: New Model Army?” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
October 11, 2006; Ben-David, “Debriefing Teams Brand IDF
Doctrine ‘Completely Wrong’,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 3,
2007; Uri Bar-Joseph, “Israel’s Military Intelligence Perfomance
in the Second Lebanon War,” International Journal of Intelligence
and Counter-Intelligence, Vol. 20, No. 4, January 2007, pp. 583-601;
Ralph Peters, “Lessons from Lebanon: The New Model Terrorist
Army,” Armed Forces Journal, Vol. 144, No. 3, October 2006;
Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Lessons of the Israeli-Lebanon
War: A Briefing” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2008) [accessed on May 1, 2008 at www.
csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080311_lessonleb-iswar.pdf]; Daniel Byman
and Steven Simon, “The No-Win Zone,” The National Interest,
Vol. 86, November/December, 2006, pp. 55-61; Sarah E. Kreps,
“The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned,” Parameters, Vol. 37,
No. 1, Spring 2007, pp. 72-83; Nicholas Blanford, “Deconstructing
Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
November 1, 2006; Steven Erlanger and Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “A
Disciplined Hezbollah Surprises Israel with its Training, Tactics,
and Weapons,” New York Times, August 7, 2006, p. A8; Jonathan D.
Zagdanski, “Round 2 in Lebanon,” Infantry, September/October
2007, pp. 32-35.
3. See, e.g., Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared; Peters, “Lessons from Lebanon”; Exum, Hizballah at War, p. 14; Cordesman,
“The Lessons of the Israeli-Lebanon War”; Byman and Simon,
“The No-Win Zone”; Kreps, “The 2006 Lebanon War,” pp. 72-83.
3

did this nonstate actor wage war in 2006? What were its
strengths, weaknesses, tactics, and strategies, and what
do these imply for the design of Western militaries that
may have to fight similar opponents in the future?
For now, answers to these questions differ. One
school sees Hezbollah as an essentially terrorist
organization using an information-age version of the
asymmetric military methods seen as typical of nonstate
actors historically. In this view, Hezbollah’s goal was
to win an information war for public opinion within
and beyond Lebanon, solidifying its political position
as the standard-bearer for Arab resistance to Israel by
drawing Israel into a guerrilla war it could not win
while publicizing the inevitable Israeli miscues and
civilian fatalities. The tactics to implement this strategy
are seen as a higher-tech version of standard guerrilla
warfare: sniping, albeit with modern antitank missiles;
hit-and-run ambushes; roadside bombs; harassing
mortar and rocket fire, often against civilian targets in
Israel; the use of Lebanese civilians as human shields to
protect guerrillas against Israeli firepower; and efforts
to goad a state military into over-use of violence and
widespread killings of innocents. What was new, in
this account, was mainly Hezbollah’s use of the internet
and sympathetic cable news networks to publicize its
military actions, which are held to have been intended
chiefly as spectacles to attract this publicity.4

4. See, e.g., Gabriel Siboni, “The Military Campaign in Lebanon,” in Brom and Elan, The Second Lebanon War, pp. 62-63; Erlich
and Kahati, Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and
Minds; Erlich, The Use of Lebanese Civilians as Human Shields; Kreps,
“The 2006 Lebanon War”; Edward Cody and Molly Moore, “The
Best Guerrilla Force in the World,” Washington Post, August 14
2006, p. A01; Kober, “The Second Lebanon War,” p. 2.

4

Others, however, see Hezbollah’s 2006 campaign
as a major departure from the asymmetric methods of
traditional terrorists or guerrillas and as a shift toward
the conventional military methods normally associated
with state actors. In this view, Hezbollah is said to
have defended ground, to have prepared positions
for sustained combat in defense of that ground, and
to have maneuvered conventionally armed, trained,
and equipped combatants in an attempt to defeat an
Israeli invasion in a way that resembled traditional
state military doctrines more closely than a traditional
terrorist organization could. What was new, in this
alternative account, is how much the 2006 campaign
differed from terrorist or guerrilla warfare—information
age or not—and how conventional and state-like the
fighting was.5
These contrasting views imply very different
policy agendas for the United States. An account
of Hezbollah as an information-age guerrilla force
strengthens the case for a major redesign of the U.S.
military to reposition it for irregular warfare. For over
a decade, critics have argued that the United States is
over-invested in conventional capability and should
restructure for irregular or low intensity conflict;
the guerrilla war in Iraq has turned this argument
into something approaching conventional wisdom
in the U.S. debate today. An interpretation of the
2006 campaign as irregular warfare reinforces the
associated case for what might be termed the “lowtech transformation” agenda. Its advocates differ in
the particulars, but most would expand the Army
and Marine Corps; reequip this larger ground force
5. See, e.g., Exum, Hizballah at War; Erlanger and Oppel, “A
Disciplined Hezbollah Surprises Israel with its Training, Tactics,
and Weapons,” p. A8; Zagdanski, “Round 2 in Lebanon,” pp. 3235.
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with lighter weapons and vehicles; restructure it to
deemphasize traditional armor and artillery in favor
of light infantry, civil affairs, military police, military
advisor, and special forces capability; and reengineer
training, doctrine, Service culture, recruitment, and
promotion systems to stress low-intensity irregular
warfare skills and methods rather than conventional
combat. And major changes in the interagency process
would be needed to replace a balkanized, slow-moving
decisionmaking system with one agile and integrated
enough to compete effectively with politically nimble,
media savvy opponents in portraying the results of
such warfare persuasively to public audiences overseas. If so, the needed changes in the defense program
would be extremely expensive; many would pay for
this by scaling back or abandoning hi-tech air and
naval modernization programs; reducing the size of the
Air Force and oceangoing Navy; and cutting back the
ground forces’ training and preparation for conventional war fighting. The result would be a very different
American military and defense establishment—from its
size to its structure, equipment, people, and doctrine.6
6. See, e.g., Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On
War in the 21st Century, St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004. For
related arguments, see Frederick Kagan, Finding the Target: The
Transformation of American Military Policy, New York: Encounter
Books, 2006; Max Boot, “The Struggle to Transform the Military,”
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2, March/April 2005, pp. 103-118;
Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire, New York:
Penguin, 2004; Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: The American
Military on the Ground, New York: Random House, 2005; Hans
Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., Transforming for Stability
and Reconstruction Operations, Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press, 2004; John A. Nagl, Institutionalizing Adaptation:
It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisory Corps, Washington, DC:
Center for a New American Security, 2007; Tom Donnelly, “The
Army We Need,” The Weekly Standard, June 4, 2007; Charles Barry,
“Organizing Land Forces for Stability Operations,” National
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Conversely, an account of Hezbollah as a conventional army weakens the case for such transformation.
Instead it implies that a conventionally structured
military is actually better suited for a future of nonstate
opponents than low-tech transformation advocates
claim. Where capabilities for low-intensity combat
can be improved without undermining conventional
performance this would always be wise, but many in
this camp see sharp tradeoffs between the forces and
training needed for irregular as opposed to conventional
combat; if so, then radical transformation would be illadvised and traditional force structures, doctrines, and
training are a better course for the future.7
We will argue below that neither of these
schools’ interpretations is completely consistent with
Hezbollah’s actual conduct of the 2006 campaign,
but that the latter is closer than the former. That is,
Hezbollah’s methods were somewhere between the
popular conceptions of guerrilla and conventional
warfare—but so are most military actors, whether state
or nonstate. The commonplace tendency to see guerrilla
and conventional methods as a stark dichotomy is a
Defense University and National Security Policy Short Course
on Force Structure for Stability Operations and Interagency
Integration, 2007; David Betz, “Redesigning Land Forces for
Wars Among the People,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 28,
No. 2, August 2007, pp. 221-243; Robert M. Perito, Where is the
Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Post-Conflict
Stability Force, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace,
2004.
7. See, e.g., Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared; Gian P. Gentile, “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” World Politics Review, March 4, 2008; Sean
McFarland, Michael Shields, and Jeffrey Snow, “The King and I:
The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire
Support to Maneuver Commanders,” White Paper for U.S. Army
Chief of Staff, nd.
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mistake and has been so for at least a century. In fact,
there are profound elements of “guerrilla” methods in
the military behavior of almost all state militaries in
conventional warfare, from tactics all the way through
strategy. And most nonstate guerrilla organizations
have long used tactics and strategies that most
observers tend to associate with state military behavior.
In reality, there is a continuum of methods between the
polar extremes of the Maginot Line and the Viet Cong,
and most real-world cases fall somewhere in between.
The 2006 Lebanon campaign, too, fell somewhere in
between. Its placement on this continuum, however, is
much further from the Viet Cong end of the scale than
many low-tech transformation advocates assume—and,
in fact, the biggest divergence between Hezbollah’s
methods and those of modern Western militaries may
well be Hezbollah’s imperfect proficiency of execution
rather than the doctrine they were trying to execute.
We base this assessment chiefly on a series of 36
primary-source interviews with Israeli participants
in the campaign who were in a position to observe
Hezbollah’s actual behavior in the field in 2006,
coupled with deductive inference from observable
Hezbollah behavior in the field to findings for their
larger strategic intent for the campaign.8 Where
possible, we supplement this with evidence drawn
8. Interviewees range in rank from Brigadier General to Second
Lieutenant, and included commanders at company, battalion, or
brigade level from a majority of Israeli brigades engaged, and from
all major sectors of the campaign. Audiotapes documenting these
interviews have been deposited at the U.S. Army Military History
Institute (MHI) archive in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and include
full identifying information for all interviewees. At the request of
the Israel Defense Force, the full identification of interviewees is
held at MHI as Official Use Only; documentation below uses rank
and first initial only, but this information is sufficient to enable
all cited information to be confirmed by those with appropriate
clearance.
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from Israeli interviews with a handful of captured
Hezbollah fighters, but we had no systematic access
to the Hezbollah side in the war, hence our findings
are drawn from a combination of Israeli observational
evidence and deduction from this.
We present the resulting analysis in six steps.
First we develop a taxonomy of military behavior,
treating this as a continuum rather than a dichotomy
of “irregular” and “conventional,” and arguing that
most real cases fall somewhere in the middle of the
theoretical range. Second, we outline the key events
of the campaign. We then characterize Hezbollah’s
tactics in 2006 by reference to the taxonomy. Next, we
do the same for their strategy and theater operations.
We follow this with an assessment of Hezbollah’s
proficiency in executing these methods. We conclude
with a summary assessment and implications for U.S.
Army and Defense policy.
TAXONOMY
“Irregular,” guerrilla, or “asymmetric” warfare
has usually been treated as a sharp dichotomy with
conventional or “combined arms” warfare in the
U.S. debate. And clearly there are major differences
between the military methods of Sunni insurgents in
Iraq and Saddam’s Republican Guard, for example.
But there are also a number of important similarities.
Many of the differences, moreover, are variations of
degree rather than kind, and even differences of kind
do not readily sort themselves into a handful of neat,
categorical alternatives.
An intention to hold ground, for example, is
commonly associated with conventional warfare.
Guerrillas, by contrast, are typically assumed to favor
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hit-and-run methods in which retention of ground is not
attempted and in which the guerrillas’ orientation is to
the enemy, not the terrain per se. That is, the classical
guerrilla chooses terrain based solely on its potential
to enable casualty infliction on the enemy, not for its
control. Guerrillas are expected to melt away when
attacked by superior government forces rather than to
stand their ground and accept decisive engagement, and
they often prefer booby traps, mines, roadside bombs,
or harassing rocket or mortar fire meant to inflict casualties without denying the opponent access to an area
per se.9
9. “Decisive engagement” is a condition wherein defenders
remain in position under assault even after the attackers have
gotten close enough that the defenders cannot readily withdraw
without being overrun. As the Defense Department defines it:
“In land and naval warfare, an engagement in which a unit is
considered fully committed and cannot maneuver or extricate
itself. In the absence of outside assistance, the action must be
fought to a conclusion and either won or lost with the forces at
hand.” [www.js.pentagon.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/d/01536.html]
On the unwillingness of classical guerrillas to accept decisive
engagement for the defense of ground, see, e.g., Mao Tse-Tung,
On Guerrilla Warfare, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Mineola, NY:
Dover, 2005, pp. 52, 97, 102; Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare,
Old Chelsea, NY: Ocean Press, 2006, pp. 20, 22, 26; Ian F.W.
Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, New York:
Routledge, 2001, p. 2; Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism:
Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 1990,
pp. 25-26; Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and
Politics of Counterinsurgency, Lexington, KY: University Press of
Kentucky, 2004, p. 18; Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and
Critical Study, Boston: Little, Brown, 1976, pp. viii, 3; Robert B.
Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, vol. 1, Garden
City, NY: Doubleday, 1975, p. xi; Steven Metz and Raymond
Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century:
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army
War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004, p. 2; Harel and
Issacharoff, 34 Days, p. 129.
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All of these techniques, however, are standard
elements of orthodox conventional doctrine, too.
Delaying actions, for example, are a normal element
of any theater defense. In a delaying action, defenders
trade space for time, weakening the attacker as it advances, disrupting the attacker’s formations and, if possible, demoralizing its troops—but without accepting
decisive engagement and without expecting to retain
any particular piece of ground.10 Mobile defense, one
of the three basic forms of defensive maneuver in
orthodox conventional doctrine, orients the defender
on the enemy’s forces rather than on particular terrain;
terrain is chosen to facilitate the destruction of the
enemy, which is the primary objective. Mobile defenses
normally involve delaying actions along the attacker’s
axis of advance; delays without decisive engagement
are also central to the conduct of conventional covering
force operations in the forward sectors of prepared
defenses in depth.11 Ambush, moreover, is a standard
technique in orthodox defense, in which defenders
strive to remain hidden and undetected until attackers
have entered a designated kill sack where they can be
surprised and taken under sudden and concentrated
fire. Such defenders may or may not hold their
positions until decisively engaged.12 Harassing fires
from mortars or artillery are common means by which
conventional defenders seek to disrupt or interdict
enemy movement in otherwise apparently safe rear
10. See, e.g., FM 3.0: Operations, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2001, paras. 8-28 through 8-31; FM
71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, Washington,
DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1998, ch. 4, section
6.
11. See, e.g., FM 3.0: Operations, paras. 8-14 through 8-19.
12. See, e.g., FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company
Team, ch. 3, Section 6; ch. 4.
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areas; mines are sometimes used to defend ground that
must be retained, but are also used elsewhere to delay,
disrupt, or inflict casualties on attackers in transit
without denying them access directly.13 Orthodox
conventional defense thus commonly includes many
actions which do not hold ground per se or accept
decisive engagement.
Of course, there are normally geographical limits
to delay and harassment in conventional defense;
conventional defenders will not allow an invader
access to the entire national territory without making
a stand somewhere. Ultimately, a conventional
defense is intended to leave the defender in control of
the country. But even guerrillas often have limits on
their willingness to allow an enemy to move: critical
locations such as base camps or weapon caches can
sometimes be defended by fighters who accept decisive
engagement in such locations.14 And many guerrilla
13. See, e.g., FM 5-102, Countermobility, Washington, DC:
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1985, ch. 2; FM 6-20-30,
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Corps and
Division Operations, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department
of the Army, 1989, appendix B, sections I and II.
14. During the Chinese civil war from 1945-49, for instance,
communist forces attempted to hold several cities in the face of
nationalist offensives: in 1945, 110,000 communist troops suffered
40,000 casualties in a failed defense of Szeping; in 1946, 20,000 of
70,000 communists were killed trying to defend Jukao; in 1947,
20,000 of 60,000 communists were killed when nationalist forces
relieved the siege of Tehwei. (Figures from Micheal Clodfelter,
Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and
Other Figures, 1500-2000, 2nd ed., Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002,
pp. 695-696.) Greek insurgents concentrated 12,000 fighters in the
Grammos Mountain region in 1949; they suffered large numbers
of casualties attempting to protect the area, and could no longer
continue significant resistance. (Joes, Resisting Rebellion, pp.
185-186) FARC guerrillas in Colombia have demonstrated the
willingness and capability to resist combined ground-air attacks
from government forces (David Spencer, “Bogota Continues to
Bleed as FARC Find their Military Feet,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
12

wars are fought over political control of a country—as
with conventional defense, the ultimate aim of many
guerrilla forces is to establish political control over a
geographically contiguous polity.15
Concealment is another trait often held to
distinguish conventional from guerrilla warfare.
Concealment is typically seen as critical for guerrilla
forces, which depend on this for survival in the face
of superior government militaries.16 Yet even in
conventional warfare, exposure frequently means
death. The modern battlefield is so lethal that it
has been suicidal to allow massed formations to be
caught exposed in the open since at least 1914. In
fact, concealment—and the techniques needed to
provide it as technology has changed—has arguably
been the single most important theme in the history
of modern conventional tactics.17 A distinguishing
feature of post-1914 conventional warfare has been the
“empty battlefield” that resulted from the widespread
adoption of cover and concealment in modern highintensity combat; soldiers in such wars commonly
develop an instinctive suspicion of conditions that
“seem too quiet” precisely because conventional
defenders are commonly invisible to attackers much of
November 1, 1998; Jeremy McDermott, “Colombian Insurgency
Escalates as Guerrillas Go Back on Offensive,” Jane’s Intelligence
Review, July 1, 2005). Guerrilla groups have conducted numerous
offensives and sieges against important strategic locations:
prominent examples include the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam,
the 1975 Khmer Rouge offensive against Phnom Penh, the 1989
FMLN offensive against San Salvador, and the Chinese communist
attack on Suchow in 1948 (See, e.g., Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed
Conflicts, pp. 689-690, 696, 712, 757-759).
15. See, e.g., Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 55-57, 113; Beckett,
Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, pp. 75-76.
16. See, e.g., Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, p. 97; Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 22; O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, pp. 53-57.
17. For a more detailed discussion, see Stephen Biddle, Military
Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, Princeton:
13

the time.18 Of course, there are differences in the way
conventional armies and guerrilla forces obtain the
needed concealment—although both use the natural
complexity of the terrain to conceal themselves (indeed
guerrillas classically exploit mountains, jungles, or
other unusually complex terrain for this purpose),
guerrillas also typically try to conceal themselves
via intermingling with an indistinguishable civilian
population. Classical guerrilla tactics assume either
that the government will be loathe to harm apparently
innocent civilians, or that the government will suffer
politically from doing so. Hence many guerrillas wear
civilian clothing and live, train, and fight among civilian
populations as a means of rendering themselves as
difficult as possible to distinguish from those civilians.19
Conventional armies, by contrast, wear distinguishing
uniforms, occupy distinct bases, and often fight in
rural areas away from civilian population centers.
But even here, the difference is often less clear than it
seems. Urban warfare has long been a major feature
of even conventional warfare (Stalingrad, Berlin, Caen,
and Aachen were among the many cities destroyed by
ground combat in World War II); villages and other
built-up areas are traditionally exploited as favorable
Princeton University Press, 2004, chs. 3 and 4.
18. See, e.g., Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of
Men in Battle, New York: Free Press, 1986; Christopher Hamner,
“Enduring Danger, Surviving Fear: Combat Experience and
American Infantrymen in the War for Independence, the Civil
War, and the Second World War,” Ph.D. dissertation, Department
of History, University of North Carolina, 2004, e.g., pp. 11, 29, 36,
54, 109, 141, 185-186, 198-199.
19. See, e.g., Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 92-93; Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 19-20, 26; Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The
Art of War in the Modern World, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007,
pp. 280-286; Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies,
p. 2; Joes, Resisting Rebellion, p. 13; Richard Clutterbuck, Guerrillas
and Terrorists, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1980, p. 26;
David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” Survival, Vol. 48,
No. 4, December 2006, p. 119.
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defensive ground in conventional warfare precisely
because of the superior concealment and cover they
offer; civilians are often killed in greater number
than uniformed soldiers in conventional combat
because even the use of uniforms does not always
enable combatants to distinguish or discriminate from
a distance or in the heat of battle; and all of this is
becoming increasingly characteristic of conventional
warfare as cities grow and economies urbanize around
the world.20 Concealment is thus critical in all modern
warfare, guerrilla or conventional, and the difference
between an emphasis on terrain for such purposes in
conventional warfare and civilian intermingling in
guerrilla warfare is more a difference in emphasis and
relative incidence than a sharp distinction of kind.
Dispersion and the apparent absence of distinctions
between a contested front and a safe rear area are
other traits commonly associated with guerrilla
warfare. Guerrillas are normally assumed to avoid
concentration and instead to spread themselves over
large areas in small, independent formations, using
stealth, concealment, and infiltration to afford them
access to any part of a theater and often choosing
preferentially to attack “soft” logistical or support
targets in nominal rear areas.21 Yet dispersion, like
20. On urban combat in conventional warfare, see Michael C.
Desch, ed., Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain,
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
2001; William G. Robertson and Lawrence A. Yates, eds., Block
by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations, Ft. Leavenworth,
KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2003;
FM 90-10: Military Operations on Urban Terrain, Washington, DC:
Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, 1979; Handbook for
Joint Urban Operations, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2000; John
A. English, On Infantry, New York: Praeger, 1984, pp. 185-216.
21. See, e.g., Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 52, 97-98, 102104; O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, pp. 25-26, 37; Joes, Resisting
Rebellion, pp. 12-13, 19; Laqueur, Guerrilla, pp. viii, 124-125;
Asprey, War in the Shadows, p. xi; Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency
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concealment, has been a central theme in the history
of modern conventional tactics. As early as 1917,
conventional militaries discovered that they could not
exploit the potential cover inherent in rural terrain
while operating in large, concentrated formations.
The natural complexity of the earth’s surface provides
an enormous amount of potential cover from enemy
fire, but such “dead ground” is irregularly distributed
and often broken into tiny patches. To take advantage
of this potential, massed linear formations had to be
broken down into small groups with only handfuls
of soldiers, sprinting from cover to cover on the basis
of the vagaries of the ground rather than the progress
of their neighbors. Movement in the presence of the
enemy came to depend increasingly on working small
groups forward unobserved, using a combination of
concealment and suppressive fire to keep them from
being annihilated by enemy fire en route. The resulting
techniques have sometimes been called “infiltration
tactics” as a result, and infiltration per se, often at night,
is a standard movement method for infantry in orthodox conventional armies.22 Coupled with the increasRedux,” pp. 117-118, 120; Metz and Millen, Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency, p. 6.
22. See, e.g., FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company
Team, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army,
1998, ch. 3, Section 2; on “infiltration tactics” in World War I, see,
e.g., Timothy Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: Changes in German
Tactical Doctrine During the First World War, Ft. Leavenworth,
KS: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 1981, Leavenworth
Paper No.4, pp. 43-46; Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham,
Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945,
London: Allen and Unwin, 1985, pp. 94-130, 139-146; Paddy
Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1994, pp. 93-100, 120-158; Bruce Gudmundsson,
Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918, New
York: Praeger, 1989; English, On Infantry, pp. 17-26; J.B.A. Bailey,
Field Artillery and Firepower, Oxford: Military Press, 1989, pp.
141-152; Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western
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ing depth of modern defenses—the Soviet defensive
system at Kursk in 1943, for example, extended over a
distance of more than 100 miles from the front line23—
this dispersion has often resulted in deliberately porous
defensive systems in which individual positions have
had to be prepared for 360-degree defense and in which
friendly and hostile forces are often intermingled in
ways that blur the distinction between front and rear.
The increasing reach of standoff fires, moreover, has
extended the threat of attack even further away from
the nominal front. For Germans on the Western Front
in 1944, for example, no location was truly safe from
Allied air attack: German General Erwin Rommel
was famously wounded during an administrative
movement in a nominal rear area in France during the
Normandy campaign when his staff car was strafed
by an Allied fighter; in today’s era of deep strike by
precision air or missile forces, even the conventional
battlefield has much less guarantee of safety in the rear
than it once did.24
Contrasts in strategic intent are another distinction
often drawn between guerrilla and conventional
warfare. In particular, conventional strategy is often
seen as an exercise in what Thomas Schelling termed
brute force; guerrilla strategy is usually seen as coercive
(and sometimes persuasive). Coercive strategies work
by convincing the enemy to give you what you want by
threatening pain if they do not (persuasion strategies
induce a similar decision via positive inducement
rather than negative sanction). Brute force strategies
Front, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, pp. 311-315, 362-366; G.C. Wynne,
If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West, London: Faber
and Faber, Ltd., 1940; Greenwood Press reprint, 1976, p. 327.
23. Jeffrey Jukes, Kursk, The Clash of Armor, New York: Ballantine, 1968, p. 54.
24. Max Hastings, Overlord, New York: Simon and Schuster,
1984, p. 176.
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work by taking what you want through force without
requiring any meaningful decision on the enemy’s
part.25 Guerrillas, in the typical view, are too weak to
prevail by brute force destruction of the enemy outright, hence they must resort to manipulating others’
decision calculus via some combination of persuasion
and coercive pain infliction as their only real options—
they aim either to convince civilians to oppose the
state, or to kill enough state soldiers or destroy enough
state value for the government (or its foreign backers)
to decide that the cost exceeds the stake at issue in
the war, yielding political concession to guerrilla
demands. States engaged in conventional warfare, by
contrast, are thought to have the material resources
to pursue their aims by brute force and to prefer this.
The very term “asymmetric warfare” stems from this
perceived distinction: traditional interstate warfare
is “symmetric” because both sides are strong enough
to use brute force methods against the other; wars
between state and nonstate actors are “asymmetric”
because the state is assumed to adopt conventional
brute force whereas its weaker nonstate enemy chooses
a different, coercive, approach instead.26
25. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1966, pp. 2-6ff.
26. See, e.g., Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory
of Asymmetric Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005; Hammes, The Sling and the Stone; Roger W. Barnett, Asymmetrical
Warfare: Today’s Challenge to U.S. Military Power, Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2003; H. John Poole, Tactics of the Crescent Moon:
Militant Muslim Combat Methods, Emerald Isle, NC: Posterity Press,
2004; Smith, The Utility of Force; Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping, Harrisburg, PA:
Stackpole, 1971; Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars:
State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel, and Lebanon,
and the United States in Vietnam, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2003; O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism; Joes, Resisting
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Yet most states use coercive strategies, too, either
alone or in conjunction with brute force. Allied
strategy in World War II, for example, involved a great
deal of brute force—the intended destruction of Axis
militaries—but it also embraced a strategic bombing
campaign whose intent was largely coercive. That is,
the Allies hoped that the destruction of hostile economic
assets and population centers would impose so much
pain on enemy societies as to convince their leaders to
make peace in order to halt the bombing. Many Allied
leaders hoped that this could be accomplished without
brute force land invasions of Germany or Japan, and
in fact Japan surrendered before the home islands
were conquered.27 American strategy in 1991 was a
mix of brute force in the ground war to drive Saddam
out of Kuwait, and coercion in a strategic bombing
campaign intended to increase Saddam’s costs by

Rebellion; Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents,
Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, New
York: Columbia University Press, 2006, pp. 18-54; Metz and Millen,
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, pp. 2, 6; Andrew J. R. Mack,
“Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric
Conflict,” World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2, January, 1975, pp. 175-200;
Stephen P. Rosen, “War and the Willingness to Suffer,” in Bruce
M. Russett, ed., Peace, War and Numbers, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage,
1972, pp. 167-183.
27. Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air
Offensive against Germany, 1939-1945, London: HMSO, 1961; Tami
Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution
of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 214-288; Robert
A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1996, pp. 87-136, 254-313.
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destroying valued assets within Iraq until and unless
he agreed to withdraw.28 NATO strategy in 1999 was
chiefly coercive, with the primary aim being to impose
financial and political pain on Slobodon Milosevic by
bombing valued economic assets in Serbia until and
unless he halted ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.29
Nor is strategic bombing the only form of coercion
in conventional interstate warfare. In almost all such
wars, the weaker power must ultimately rely on a
coercive logic to prevail. In World War II, for example,
Japan realized it had no chance of destroying the U.S.
military—American population, wealth, and industrial
advantages were too great, enabling America to crush
Japan militarily if it chose to mobilize fully and pay
the price. Japan’s only hope was to raise the price of
doing so to one that Americans would not pay: by
killing enough U.S. soldiers, sailors, and Marines
in a tenacious defense of their Pacific conquests, the
Japanese hoped to convince the Americans to accept
a negotiated peace that would preserve Japanese
expansion rather than fighting on until Japan was
destroyed.30 Germany is among the states most often
cited as relying on brute force battlefield annihilation
28. On the coercive nature of the Gulf War air campaign, see
Eliot A. Cohen, Director, Gulf War Airpower Survey, Vol. I, Part
I: Planning, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1993, pp. 123, 130-131, 163; Pape, Bombing to Win, pp. 214-219ff.
29. See, e.g., Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2000, esp. pp. 91-96, 101, 208-210.
30. James B. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific
War, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, p. 23; Gerhard L.
Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 190-191; Woodburn
Kirby, The War against Japan, Vol. 5, London: HMSO, 1969, pp.
96, 149, 393-406; Robert J. C. Butow, Japan’s Decision to Surrender,
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954, p. 43, reference 1;
Pape, Bombing to Win, pp. 110-113.
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of military opponents rather than political coercion.31
Yet German strategy in both World Wars came to rely
increasingly on political coercion rather than military
brute force once the tide of battle turned against
them. By 1917, for example, no rational German could
conclude that an Allied coalition including the distant
United States could be militarily destroyed; the only
option was to raise the cost of continuing the war to the
point where at least some key opponents would accept
a negotiated settlement tolerable to Germany, and
German strategy increasingly reflected this.32 In World
War II, even Hitler no longer hoped to destroy Allied
armies outright or to deny them access to German soil
by 1944; instead German strategy hoped to exploit
Western war weariness by inflicting casualties, using
a form of coercive cost imposition to split the Allied
coalition and persuade Western governments to accept
a separate peace that would leave Hitler in power.33
In all three examples—Imperial Japan, Wilhelmine
Germany, and Nazi Germany—state governments in
“conventional” world wars pursued strategic logics
that were centrally coercive. In fact, this is such a
31. See, e.g., Gunther Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the
Problem of Strategic Envelopment,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of
Modern Strategy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp.
296-325; Jehuda Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation,
Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986; J. P. Harris, “The Myth of
Blitzkrieg,” War in History, Vol. 2, No. 3, November 1995, pp. 335352.
32. Erich von Falkenhayn, General Headquarters and Its Critical
Decisions, London: Hutchinson, 1919, p. 216; Ottokar Czernin, In
the World War, New York: Cassell, 1919, p. 116; Hein Goemans,
War & Punishment: The Causes of War Termination & the First World
War, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 88, 97.
33. Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 587-588; John Keegan, The
Second World War, New York: Penguin, 1990, pp. 209-210; B. H.
Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, New York: Putnam’s,
1970, pp. 169, 485, 493; Pape, Bombing to Win, pp. 288-289.
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common great power strategy in major conventional
warfare that Clausewitz treats it as a fundamental
feature of war per se and discusses it as such explicitly
and at length in On War.34
The ubiquity of coercive strategy in conventional
warfare between states creates conceptual problems
for the entire notion of “asymmetric” warfare as a
rigorous logical distinction. Strictly speaking, almost
all wars, even conventional, interstate world wars,
are asymmetric: the two sides almost never pursue
identical strategies, or even broadly similar ones—this
would be foolhardy for the weaker contestant. The
stronger side often tries to secure its aims by brute
force, but the weaker normally adopts some form of
coercion. This is hardly unique to guerrilla wars or
to conflicts between state and nonstate opponents;
a strategic logic based on political coercion does not
uniquely distinguish guerrilla from conventional
warfare. Of course, there are many varieties of brute
force and coercion, and some combatants employ
versions of coercion that are superficially more similar
to versions of brute force than others; the Viet Cong
in 1965 and Sunni insurgents in 2004 obviously
fought differently than the Imperial Japanese Army
in 1944 or the Iraqi Republican Guard in 1991. But all
four of these examples were pursuing strategies of
political coercion against opponents that many have
characterized as pursuing strategies of conventional military brute force—the actors’ strategic logic does
not cleanly distinguish “guerrilla” from “conventional,”
and “asymmetry” is properly regarded as a feature
of almost all strategy rather than as a meaningful
34. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter
Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1976, pp. 90-99.
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distinction between irregular and “regular” warfare.
None of this is to suggest that guerrilla warfare and
conventional combat are identical or that there are no
important differences. They are obviously not the same
thing.
But it is to argue that the key distinctions are differences
of degree not kind. And this suggests that the difference
between “guerrilla” and “conventional” war making is
not well-treated as a dichotomy, but is more accurately
described as a continuum.
Figure 1 presents this continuum in graphical form.
At one extreme would be historical cases such as the
French defense of the Maginot Line in 1940. Such cases
involve tactical dispositions where combatants are
expected to fight mostly from static, prepared positions
with a minimum of movement; decisive engagement is
routinely accepted, and little ground is to be yielded
voluntarily; dispositions are oriented much more to
the terrain and much less to the enemy’s particular
locations; dispositions are relatively concentrated with
a large fraction of the total deployed forward near the
international border or the current frontier dividing
clear spheres of control; and concealment is obtained by
use of the terrain, often augmented by elaborate manmade camouflage or terrain modification. Strategy in
this extreme would involve an emphasis on brute force
prevention of enemy entry into friendly territory or
brute force destruction of enemy forces outright.
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Figure 1. A Taxonomy of Military Behavior.
At the opposite extreme would be historical cases
such as the Viet Cong in 1965. Such cases involve tactical
dispositions where combatants rarely fight from static,
prepared positions or accept decisive engagement;
combat normally involves movement; ground is
rarely contested per se; dispositions and maneuver are
oriented much more to the enemy rather than the terrain;
dispositions are widely dispersed over large areas with
little apparent orientation to any geographic border
and no apparent distinction between front and rear;
and concealment is obtained chiefly by intermingling
with an indistinguishable civilian population. Strategy
in this extreme would emphasize political coercion via
the infliction of casualties and other costs, rather than
brute force destruction of the enemy outright or any
absolute ability to deny the enemy access to friendly
territory.
These two extremes represent the closest cases to
“pure” guerrilla or conventional war fighting styles.
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Very few real-world cases conform perfectly to either
extreme, however; almost all fall somewhere in
between.
The German “elastic defense” on the Western Front
from 1916-18, for example, obtained concealment via
the terrain and disposed its forces largely around the
nature of the terrain rather than the enemy’s locations,
but it was distributed over a depth of 3 to 10 miles, and
was built around the assumption that ground would
not be held to the death. In fact, the German command
referred to this doctrine as the An-sich-herankommenlassen, or “invitation-to-walk-right-in,” system: attackers would be allowed to advance into the depths of the
defense, where they would eventually be halted and
repulsed by counterattack. The larger intention was
still to retain ground in the end, but it was expected
that the means to this end would be fluid, involving a
heavy emphasis on movement and counterattack and
discouraging decisive engagement in static defenses of
specific points.35 This is still a long way from the Viet
Cong, but it was substantially less “conventional” than
the Maginot Line.
German World War II defensive doctrine was still
less “conventional.” The German defenses opposing
the British offensive in Operation GOODWOOD of
July 1944, for example, were distributed over a depth of
35. See, e.g., G. C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in
Depth in the West, London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1940; Greenwood Press reprint, 1976, pp. 191-318; Timothy Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the
First World War, Ft. Leavenworth KS: U.S. Army Combat Studies
Institute, 1981, Leavenworth Paper No. 4, pp. 1-36; Wilhelm Balck,
Development of Tactics, World War, Harry Bell tr., Ft. Leavenworth,
KS: The General Service Schools Press, 1922 trans. of 1920 orig.,
pp. 151-168; Ritter von Leeb, Defense, Stefan Possony and Daniel
Vilfroy, trans., Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Pub. Co., 1943
trans. of 1938 orig., pp. 77-99.
25

more than 10 miles and built around a series of fortified
French farming villages whose civilian buildings and
outworks were exploited for concealment. Most of the
defensive system’s combat power was held in mobile
reserve still further to the rear, and success rested on the
assumption that the prepared positions would merely
delay an attack while this large reserve maneuvered
fluidly to its flanks for the counterattacks that were
expected to halt the attacker; forward defenses were
not expected to hold ground to the last cartridge, but
were to break contact and withdraw if possible to
reinforce other defenses to their rear.36
The U.S. defense of Saudi Arabia in Operation
DESERT SHIELD of 1990 was even less like the Maginot
Line. Here, a covering force of under 50,000 troops was
expected to fight only a delaying action, withdrawing
gradually through a zone of 80 miles depth without
accepting decisive engagement, while setting the stage
for a climactic action to be fought in a main battle area
extending back to 150 miles from the frontier. On the
critical coastal sector, a total defensive force of less
than 170,000 troops was dispersed over more than
12,000 square miles (or an average density of under 15
soldiers per square mile), and was expected to fight a
fluid, distributed action oriented largely to the enemy
rather than the peculiarities of the ground.37
36. Biddle, Military Power, ch. 6.
37. Troop counts are taken from Eliot A. Cohen, Director,
Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. V: Statistical Compendium,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 51,
for the week ending October 31, 1990; dispositions are taken
from U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf
War, Final Report to Congress Pursuant to Title V of Public Law
102-25, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April
1992, p. 40, and represent deployments as of “October 1990.” The
troop count in Cohen is for U.S. Army and Marine contributions;
dispositions in the coastal sector include one Saudi Arabian
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Other intermediate cases are usually thought of as
“guerrilla” actions but display important features of
conventional war fighting. The Tet Offensive of 1968,
for example, combined raids by the Viet Cong with setpiece offensives by North Vietnamese army regulars
as at Hue, Khe Sanh, and Saigon, which were intended
to take and hold major Allied positions and involved
sustained heavy combat for control of key terrain. The
Communist attempt to overrun the fortified Marine
base at Khe Sanh, for example, continued through more
than 2 months of heavy fighting. North Vietnamese
and Viet Cong forces actually captured Hue City and
defended it against a sustained counterattack until
driven out in a battle that resembled World War II
urban warfare and lasted more than 3 weeks.38
Partisan warfare offers yet another intermediate
case. Soviet partisan operations using lightly armed
irregulars in mostly civilian clothing to raid German
supply lines behind the combat front in the east during
World War II employed tactics typically associated
with guerrilla warfare, but did so on a vast scale and
in the context of a mostly-conventional World War:
Operation CONCERTO in September 1943, for example, employed over 200,000 partisan combatants to
infantry brigade and two Saudi mechanized battalions in the
covering force zone; I assume a total of 7,000 soldiers for these,
which is almost certainly an overestimate. I also assume an entire
division personnel slice for each U.S. division shown in the sector,
which is also an upper bound on actual strength in the defended
zone. The troop density figures in the text above are thus highly
conservative.
38. Keith William Nolan, The Battle for Saigon: Tet 1968, New
York: Pocket Books, 1996; Nolan, Battle for Hue: Tet 1968, Novato,
CA: Presidio Press, 1983; John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe, Valley
of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991;
James J. Wirtz, “The Battles for Saigon and Hue: Tet 1968” in
Desch, Soldiers in Cities, pp. 75-87.

27

disrupt German rail traffic over a 900 by 400 kilometer
zone.39
Intermediate points such as these characterize
most actual historical warfare—the Maginot Line and
the Viet Cong in 1965 are outliers in their extremity.
The reality of military behavior is variance of degree
along a continuum between uncommon extremes. The
resulting differences are important—they can give
rise to very different optimal military responses from
the United States. But they are not easily captured
by a simple dichotomy between “conventional” and
“guerrilla” or “irregular,” which conceals as much
as it reveals, and creates a great deal of inevitable
tension between the expectations created by the simple
categories and the real behavior of actual militaries,
few of whom conform to the categories’ expectations
very consistently.40 To characterize any given military’s
39. Kenneth Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas: Soviet Partisans in World
War II, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006; Alexander
Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front: The Soviet Partisan Movement
in North-West Russia, 1941-1944, London: Frank Cass, 2005; Leonid
D. Grenkevich, The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944: A Critical
Historiographical Analysis, London: Frank Cass, 1999, pp. 223-272.
40. Of course, it is always possible to truncate a continuum at
some arbitrary cutoff point and reduce it to a dichotomy. One
could, for example, declare that anything less “conventional”
than the Tet Offensive will be defined as “irregular” or “guerrilla”
warfare and vice versa. Any continuum can be simplified into a
set of discrete categories; the larger the number of categories,
the closer the simplification approaches the continuous reality.
To reflect the diversity of real military behavior, however,
would require multiple intermediate categories, losing much of
the benefit of the putative simplification. Some, however, have
recently added a single intermediate category of “hybrid warfare”:
see, esp., Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of
Hybrid Wars, Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies,
2007. The notion of “hybrid” war makes a valuable contribution
in breaking down unhelpful dichotomies between “conventional”
and “guerrilla,” and is a clear and important step in the right
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behavior thus requires a more discriminating analysis
that parses behavior into its component parts, treats
them independently, and identifies differences of
degree in magnitude as well as differences of kind
where these exist. We now turn to that assessment for
Hezbollah in 2006, beginning with a brief outline of the
key events of the campaign.
CAMPAIGN OVERVIEW
The 2006 Lebanon Campaign opened when Hezbollah ambushed an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) patrol
and captured two Israeli soldiers on July 12.41 The
Israeli Air Force (IAF) quickly retaliated against targets
direction. Reliance on a single new category, however, poses
conceptual problems. Hoffman sees “hybrid” wars as a novel form,
yet strictly interpreted, his definition of “hybrid” encompasses
almost all real historical warfare in this middle category: Hoffman
defines “hybrid” wars as those involving conventional and
irregular methods by the same units in the same battlespace (ibid.,
e.g. pp. 8, 29). But as noted above, only the rare extrema involve
any battlespace that lacks some aspects of both conventional and
guerrilla methods—amalgams in the same time and space are
the norm, not the exception. Hoffman does not explicitly define
or bound the “conventional” and “irregular” categories in terms
that enable unambiguous classification of cases (the monograph’s
discussion of the Lebanon case, for example, does not actually try
to establish whether Hezbollah “conventional” units did or did
not also employ “irregular” methods in the same battlespace or if
so, how—the discussion focuses on the conventional features of
the campaign). Hoffman at times implies, in fact, that all future
warfare may converge on this hybrid model (p. 28, but cf. p. 43).
We thus adopt a continuum here rather than a trichotomous
“conventional-irregular-hybrid” simplification, but the latter
is clearly an important improvement over the dichotomous
treatment so common in the field.
41. Yaakov Katz, Herb Keinon et al., “Eight IDF Soldiers Killed,
2 Kidnapped on Northern Frontier,” Jerusalem Post, July 12, 2006;
Harel and Issacharoff, 34 Days, pp. 3-5; Blanford, “Deconstructing
Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess.”
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in Lebanon. Before dawn on July 13, the IAF executed
Operation SPECIFIC GRAVITY, destroying more than
50 of Hezbollah’s long-range rocket launchers in a
pre-planned, 34-minute strike.42 Other early targets
included Hezbollah observation posts along the
border, Hezbollah compounds in the Dahyia section
of Beirut, and roads and bridges that Israel believed
might be used to exfiltrate the abducted soldiers. Over
the course of the campaign, the IAF flew roughly 5,000
strike missions, primarily directed at the Dahyia, the
Beqaa Valley near the Syrian border, and the region
south of the Litani River. (See Figure 2.)43

Credit: United Nations Cartographic Section.

Figure 2. Map of Southern Lebanon.
42. Arkin, Divining Victory, pp. 170-171; Rubin, The Rocket
Campaign, p. 18; “Halutz: Mr. PM, We Won the War,” YNetnews.
com, August 27, 2006.
43. Arkin, Divining Victory, pp. 63, 73, and Appendix C.
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Meanwhile, despite losing many of its long-range
launchers early in the war, Hezbollah began what
would become a steady stream of rocket fire into Israel.
In total, Hezbollah fired an estimated 4,000 rockets,
the vast majority of which were 122 mm Katyushas
stationed within 20 kilometers of the Israeli border.44
Hezbollah launched 100 or more rockets on 22 of 34
days in the campaign, including 220 on the final day
of the war. About 900 of these rockets landed in urban
areas, causing 53 civilian deaths.45
Israel made its first major ground incursion into
Lebanon on July 19. IDF units advanced from the Israeli
village of Avivim toward Marun ar Ras, a Lebanese
town on high ground controlling much of the border
area as well as the approach to the larger town of
Bint Jubayl. The IDF met heavier resistance than they
expected, including a protracted firefight at the Shaked
outpost overlooking Marun ar Ras on July 19 and
another battle inside the town on July 20.46 When the
IDF moved into Bint Jbeil, it encountered even tougher
defenses, precipitating one of the largest firefights of
the war on July 26.47
By the end of July, the IDF had conducted operations
in several other towns close to the border, including
Marwahin, Ayta ash Shab, Kafr Kila, and At Tayyibah,
but it had made no attempt to control territory
systematically in southern Lebanon. This changed on
44. Rubin, The Rocket Campaign, pp. 10-11; Arkin, Divining Victory, pp. 55-56, 59.
45. Rubin, The Rocket Campaign, pp. 10-15.
46. Winograd, Final Report, pp. 87-89; Shelah and Limor,
Captives in Lebanon, pp. 161-165; Rapaport, Friendly Fire, pp. 145147; Katz, “Heavy IDF Casualties in Firefight at Border,” Jerusalem
Post, July 21, 2006, p. 1.
47. Winograd, Final Report, pp. 111, 131; Shelah and Limor,
Captives in Lebanon, pp. 187-191; Rapaport, Friendly Fire, pp. 198199; Ed Blanche, “IDF Setback at Bint Jbeil,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
August 9, 2006.
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July 31 when the Israeli Cabinet approved Operation
CHANGE OF DIRECTION 8, designed to take and
hold a “security zone” several kilometers wide along
the entire border. The operation involved roughly
10,000 soldiers from eight brigades including, for the
first time in the campaign, the deployment of reserves
into combat.48 By August 9, IDF forces were operating
in almost every town along the border, pushing as
far as Dibil in the south (4.5 km from Israel) and Al
Qantarah in the northeast (7 km from Israel).49
On August 11, the IDF launched the final phase
of the ground campaign, Operation CHANGE OF
DIRECTION 11.50 Described as a “push to the Litani,”
the main effort was actually a westward advance
parallel to the river: an armored column from the 401st
Brigade moved from At Tayyibeh toward Frun and
Ghanduriyih (about 12 km west of Israel’s northern tip)
in order to link up with troops from the Nahal Brigade
who had been airlifted into position.51 As the 401st
moved toward its objective through the Saluqi valley
on August 12, it was ambushed with anti-tank guided
missile (ATGM) fire; 11 tanks were hit, and 12 soldiers
were killed.52 Meanwhile, Hezbollah had regrouped
in Ghanduriyih, leading to firefights in the town and
48. Winograd, Final Report, pp. 140-141; Ben-David, “Israel
Re-Establishes ‘Security Zone’ in Southern Lebanon,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, August 9, 2006; Harel and Issacharoff, 34 Days,
p. 173; Makovsky and White, Lessons and Implications of the IsraelHizballah War, p. 41.
49. Arkin, Divining Victory, p. 51; Blanford, “Deconstructing
Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess.”
50. Winograd, Final Report, pp. 201-205.
51. Ben-David, “IDF Conducts Massive Airlift Operation into
Lebanon,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 23, 2006.
52. Winograd, Final Report, pp. 212-213; Shelah and Limor,
Captives in Lebanon, pp. 395-396; Exum, Hizballah at War, p. 11;
Harel and Issacharoff, 34 Days, pp. 221-224.
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its surrounding area throughout the final 2 days of the
war.53
At 8 a.m. on August 14, Israel and Hezbollah
implemented a United Nations (UN) Security Council
ceasefire. By this time, the IDF had taken up ground
positions in more than two dozen Lebanese towns,
though a large portion of ground below the Litani—
north of Al Mansuri and west of Ghanduriyih—had
seen almost no IDF ground presence during the
campaign.54 In 34 days of fighting, the IDF had sustained 119 combat fatalities; Hezbollah had lost at
estimated 650 to 750 fighters.55
HEZBOLLAH TACTICS IN LEBANON, 2006
Hezbollah’s behavior has already been subject to
a wide range of assessments, mostly on the basis of
subjective judgments using ambiguous criteria, yielding a great deal of disagreement with limited prospects
for closure. Our aim here is to provide a more replicable, objectively coded assessment with stronger potential for cumulation into a consensus view in the analytical community. To do this, we identify a series of directly observable, disaggregate variables corresponding to the key differences of kind and degree in the taxonomy above; we then code these variables for the Hezbollah case on the basis of direct observational
evidence drawn chiefly from our interviews with IDF
participants in the fighting. Together with the results
of a similar process for theater strategy and operations,
we then use the resulting codings to place Hezbollah
on the spectrum presented in the taxonomy discussion
above.
53. Winograd, Final Report, pp. 212-213, 217-218, 224; Shelah
and Limor, Captives in Lebanon, pp. 395-396.
54. Arkin, Divining Victory, pp. 51-52.
55. This range is given in Arkin, Divining Victory, p. 74.
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In particular, at the tactical level of war we code
values for six variables relating to the degree to
which the actor contests ground and accepts decisive
engagement, and the manner in which concealment is
sought:
• the duration of firefights;
• the proximity of attackers to defenders;
• the incidence of counterattack;
• the incidence of harassing fires and unattended
minefields;
• the proximity of combatants to civilians; and
• the use of uniforms to distinguish combatants
from civilians.
The Duration of Firefights.
Conventional defenders who seek to hold the
ground they occupy must remain in position as long as
they are under attack. Against a determined attacker,
this can produce extended engagements or a series
of renewed firefights in single locations. By contrast,
classical guerrillas who seek only to inflict casualties
at minimum cost and minimum risk to themselves
rarely remain in place over extended durations, as
this enables government forces to fix their locations
and bring superior firepower to bear. Instead, classical
guerrilla ambushes are brief, to enable the guerrillas
to escape after a one-sided surprise volley of fire
at an unsuspecting target. Of course, conventional
defenders who are destroyed or broken quickly can
fail to hold a position very long; conventional attackers
who are destroyed or driven off quickly can terminate
engagements early. Brief firefights can thus be observed in either the conventional or guerrilla extreme.
But extended firefights over individual positions are
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inconsistent with an extremum of guerrilla tactics and
suggest instead an attempt to hold ground. Hence the
longer the observed duration of firefights, the greater
the degree to which the actor’s methods approximate
the conventional extreme.
In Lebanon in 2006, Hezbollah defenders often
engaged in very extended firefights—certainly far
longer than one would expect from guerrillas with no
intention of holding ground. At the Shaked outpost,
for example, a dug-in Hezbollah defensive position
remained in place on a critical hillcrest near the Israeli
border between Avivim and Marun ar Ras, exchanging
fire with IDF tanks and infantry for more than 12
hours before finally being destroyed in place by Israeli
fire.56 At Marun ar Ras, Hezbollah defenders held
their positions through a 5-7 hour struggle with IDF
attackers.57 At Bint Jubayl, Hezbollah defenders fought
a series of pitched battles over a period of more than 4
days, including individual firefights lasting as long as
8 hours, as on July 26, and 6 hours, as on July 28, and
sporadic fighting continued in the town until the end
of the war on August 14.58 At Ghanduriyih, the fighting
lasted for more than 2 days (August 12-14), including
firefights of 7-8 hours at a time.59 The battle for At
Tayyibah on July 29-30 lasted 24 hours, including 4-5
hours of especially heavy fighting at close quarters.60
Al Qantarah saw a 4-hour long engagement.61 In the
56. 1LT O int., MHI:031308a1.
57. 1LT T int., MHI:031308p2; see also LTC N int., MHI:031308p3.
58. MAJ S int., MHI:031708a3; COL H int., MHI:121817a;
1LT B int., MHI:031318a2.
59. LTC R int., MHI:121807p4; LTC A int., MHI:031608p3;
COL M int., MHI:031608a1.
60. LTC S int., MHI:031608a2.
61. LTC A int., MHI:031608p3.
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Saluqi valley, Hezbollah ATGM teams occupying a
series of positions in depth received return fire from
Israeli Merkava tanks after their initial launches, but
stood their ground and continued to fire at least 10
additional missiles, ceasing fire and withdrawing
only when IDF artillery was brought to bear.62 Some
engagements were shorter, but many were sustained
over many hours or many days duration.63
The Proximity of Attackers to Defenders.
Conventional defenders who seek to hold the
ground they occupy against an advancing attacker
must also stand that ground even as the attacker
closes with, and potentially reaches, their positions.
By contrast, classical guerrillas who seek only to inflict
casualties at minimum cost and minimum risk to
themselves rarely allow superior government forces
to close with them over any extended advance under
fire. The risk of decisive engagement grows as an
attacker closes with a defender; to allow an attacker
into close proximity is to risk being unable to break
contact and escape. Ambushes with an overwhelming
concentration of fire delivered suddenly against an
exposed target will sometimes be triggered at close
range to maximize surprise and accuracy, but such
tactics are risky for guerrillas and, when undertaken,
must be concluded quickly. Frequent combat at close
proximity, and especially, close proximity tolerated for
more than a few minutes in a surprise ambush, thus
62. 1LT O int., MHI:031308a3.
63. The firefight at Haddatha on August 12, for example,
lasted under 2 hours: MAJ K int., MHI:031608p2; the action at
Rabb ath Thalathin on July 30 lasted about an hour: MAJ E int.,
MHI:031708a2. Not all engagements were of extended duration,
but many were—far more than one would expect of a combatant
with no intention of holding ground.
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tends to imply behavior closer to the conventional
end of the spectrum. Other things being equal, the
greater the observed incidence of close-quarters
fighting, the greater the degree to which the actor’s
methods approximate the conventional extreme.
In Lebanon in 2006, Hezbollah defenders frequently
held their positions and continued to fire even after
IDF attackers closed to very short ranges—often
well within the bounds of decisive engagement for
the defenders. The Hezbollah defensive position at
Shaked, for example, was finally overrun in place by
Israeli assault; the garrison’s 20 fighters were all killed
without any attempt at withdrawal or surrender over
the course of a 12-hour battle.64 Hezbollah defenses at
Marun ar Ras and Bint Jubayl were similarly held until
destroyed in close combat after extended advances to
ranges of as little as 10-100 meters, with no apparent
attempt to break contact or withdraw.65 At Marun ar
Ras, Aytarun, and Markaba, Hezbollah defenders held
their fire until advancing IDF infantry had passed their
outlying posts and were within the defense system
itself, making withdrawal impossible.66 At Bayt Yahun,
Hezbollah defenders allowed Israeli tanks to drive by
windows on the street below, opening small-arms fire
against IDF armored vehicle commanders standing in
open hatches at ranges of under 20 meters.67 At Marun
ar Ras, Hezbollah defenders fought literally room-toroom within buildings after IDF attackers had entered
the structures.68 At Ghanduriyih, defenders whose
positions had been flanked but who retained potential
64. 1LT O int., MHI:031308a1.
65. COL H int., MHI:121817a; MAJ S int., MHI:031708a3;
LTC O int., MHI:121607p; 1LT O int., MHI:031308a1; 1LT T int.,
MHI:031308p2.
66. 1LT O int., MHI:031308a1; 1LT Y int., MHI:031308p1.
67. 1LT Y int., MHI:031308p1.
68. 1LT T int., MHI:031308p2.
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escape routes through the town nevertheless remained
in position and were eventually destroyed in close
combat; IDF attackers could make only 600 meters of
progress in a day of hard fighting. Of the Hezbollah
fighters, 57 dead bodies were recovered from the
town.69 At At Tayyibah, the Hezbollah garrison lost 20
of its 30 fighters in close combat before being ordered to
withdraw.70 At Aytarun, the defenders were withdrawn
only when it became apparent that their position had
become tactically irrelevant—the IDF had bypassed
them, reaching Marun ar Ras from the southwest and
rendering the blocking position at Aytarun moot.71 At
Haddatha, some 30 fighters remained in position in
the village until the ceasefire, even after the IDF had
nominally occupied the village.72 There was thus a
substantial volume of close-quarters combat in 2006;
some of the defenders involved may have expected
to annihilate the attackers by surprise safely at pointblank range, but in many of these cases, the defenders
were accepting decisive engagement in the context of
protracted firefights that are more consistent with an
intent to hold ground.
The Incidence of Counterattack.
Conventional defenders who seek to hold ground
must counterattack periodically to retake lost positions.
Deliberately closing with the enemy in a counterattack,
69. LTC R int., MHI:121807p4; LTC A int., MHI:031608p3.
Note that the survivors eventually withdrew in violation of orders
to stand their ground: ibid.
70. LTC S int., MHI:031608a2.
71. 1LT O int., MHI:031308a1. See also LTC D int., MHI:
121807p3, on receiving fire from Hezbollah positions that had
been previously bypassed throughout the theater.
72. MAJ K int., MHI:031608p2.
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however, usually involves a greater degree of exposure
than does a well-prepared defense. Classical guerrillas
who seek one-sided attrition of the enemy but not
the retention of ground thus make very sparing use
of counterattack by maneuver. Hence the greater the
observed incidence of counterattack, the greater the
degree to which the actor’s methods approach the
conventional extreme.
Hezbollah did not routinely or uniformly
counterattack when driven from positions, as German
defenders, for example, typically did in World War
II.73 But there are multiple documented examples
nevertheless of Hezbollah counterattacks in 2006. At
Marun ar Ras on July 20, 15-30 Hezbollah fighters,
advancing from the direction of Bint Jubayl, conducted
a deliberate assault on an Israeli company position
occupying a group of buildings on the crest of Hill 951.
The Hezbollah attackers divided into two elements,
supported by fire from a school building in the town east
of the hill, striking the Israeli company simultaneously
and by surprise, opening fire from a range of 40 meters,
mounting multiple attempts after being beaten back
initially, and eventually reaching hand-to-hand combat
with the defenders.74 At Bint Jubayl, a detachment of
40-60 fighters attacked Israeli defenses on Hill 850. The
attackers were again divided into a main and secondary
effort, with supporting ATGM fire from two directions
73. See, e.g, Timothy A. Wray, Standing Fast: German Defensive
Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II: Prewar to March
1943, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, 1986, pp. 9-16; House, Combined Arms Warfare in the
Twentieth Century, p. 163.
74. LTC N int., MHI:031308p3 and associated sketch map,
MHI:031308p3m; COL H int., MHI:121817a. Note that COL H
describes the school building as being to the north of Hill 951. For
other instances of counterattacks at Marun ar Ras, see LTC A int.,
MHI:121608a.
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and at least sporadic indirect fire support from remotely
located mortar teams. The attack closed to within 10
meters of the Israeli positions before being driven off.75
In the casbah at Ayta ash Shab, Hezbollah fighters
assaulted, and succeeding in entering, a group of IDFdefended buildings.76 At Muhaybib, 15-20 Hezbollah
fighters assaulted IDF-defended buildings in groups
of 3-4, operating on multiple axes, and supported by
ATGM fire.77 At Ghanduriyih, a single team of 3-5
fighters counterattacked the IDF after it had taken up
positions in the casbah.78 At Dayr Siryan, Hezbollah
fighters assaulted Israeli positions from two directions
with supporting fire from rocket propelled grenades
(RPGs).79 At Tayyibah on July 29, 10 Hezbollah fighters
counterattacked after the IDF took the first in a line of
Hezbollah-occupied houses, in an apparent attempt to
retake the building.80 In fact, there are many accounts of
apparent counterattacks from across the theater; not all
of these, however, can be distinguished unambiguously
from confused movement toward undetected Israeli
positions, ambush attempts, or other actions that may
not have involved the intention to regain lost ground.81
75. On this and several other observed Hezbollah
counterattacks in Bint Jubayl using multiple assault teams on
multiple axes with supporting fire from ATGMs or mortars,
see LTC N int., MHI:031308p3; COL H int., MHI:121817a; 1LT B
int., MHI:031308a2. For a secondary account of this fighting, see
Blanche, “IDF Setback at Bint Jbeil.”
76. COL H int., MHI:121817a.
77. 1LT B int., MHI:031308a2.
78. LTC R int., MHI:121807p4. Hezbollah defenders at
Ghanduriyih occupied a series of defensive lines disposed in
depth; on several occasions when a line was taken, defenders
would maneuver to the attackers’ flanks in an apparent attempt
to retake the positions: LTC A int., MHI:031608p3.
79. COL A int., MHI:122007p.
80. LTC S int., MHI:031608a2
81. See, for example, the accounts of actions at At Tayyibah,
Aytarun, Haddatha (in which a small team of about five fighters
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None of these actions, moreover, was at anything larger
than platoon scale, and none succeeded in securing its
territorial objective. But the engagements noted above
were all unambiguous, deliberate attempts to close with
Israeli defenders in positions recently taken by the IDF
in ways that imply an intent to regain lost ground.
The Incidence of Harassing Fires and Unattended
Minefields.
Conventional defenders seeking to hold ground by
halting a determined attacker’s advance require aimed
fire in heavy volume. Minefields and other barrier
systems can be of great assistance to any defender, but
their ability to halt attackers is much reduced if the
barrier is not overwatched by direct fire to interfere with
clearance or avoidance. Aimed direct fire, however,
requires an exposure to return fire. Guerrillas who do
not seek to halt an advance outright but merely to inflict
casualties can avoid return fire by striking from a safe
distance with harassing indirect fires and unattended
minefields, and will often prefer this. Harassing fires
and unattended minefields can occur in any kind of
conflict, but massed indirect fire and minefields or
barriers tied in with direct fire overwatch are thus much
more common in conventional than classical guerrilla
warfare. Hence the greater the observed incidence
of massed observed indirect fires and overwatched
minefields, the greater the degree to which the actor’s
methods approximate the conventional extreme.
assaulted an IDF-occupied house on August 12, supported by fire
from multiple directions; they successfully entered the building,
killed an IDF soldier in an exchange of fire at very short range, and
attempted to pull the body from the house before being driven
off with the loss of at least four attackers), and Mays al Jabal in:
COL A int., MHI:122007p; 1LT Y int., MHI:031308p1; MAJ K int.,
MHI:031608p2; LTC R int., MHI:121807p4.
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Hezbollah in 2006 made considerable battlefield
use of indirect fire, especially mortars, and had mined
substantial stretches of southern Lebanon. But rarely
was Hezbollah’s mortar fire concentrated or intense.
There were exceptions: at Markaba, for example, one
IDF unit received at least 120 mortar rounds in the
course of the assault.82 And, of course, Hezbollah’s rocket fire on Israeli civilian targets was heavy and sustained. Most battlefield mortar use, however, was accurate
but light in volume and variable in its targeting.83
Hezbollah minefield employment was sometimes tied
into direct fire defensive systems in a systematic way
and sometimes not. The defenses in Ghanduriyih, for
example, included mines and obstacles overwatched
by fires.84 The main approach route up the Saluqi
valley to the Litani River was mined and overwatched
by well-concealed ATGM positions, requiring the IDF
to undertake deliberate assault clearance by combined
arms teams of combat engineers, tanks, and artillery.85
Hezbollah defenses at Marun ar Ras were coordinated
with elaborate mining of the main roadway at Junction
8; detonation of these explosives triggered the direct
fire action in defense of the town on July 20.86 Some
minefields south of the Litani were organized to
canalize IDF vehicles into open ground within range
and in view of ATGM positions north of the river.87 Yet
the most extensive Hezbollah minefields could readily
be bypassed, and Israeli combat engineers encountered
82. COL A int., MHI:122007p.
83. See, e.g., MAJ E int., MHI:031708a1; LTC A int.,
MHI:121607a; LTC R int., MHI:121807p4; 1LT O int., MHI:031308a1;
LTC A int., MHI:031608p3; COL H int., MHI:121807a; LTC O int.,
MHI:121607a.
84. LTC R int., MHI:121807p4.
85. 1LT O int., MHI:031308a3.
86. LTC N int., MHI:031308p3.
87. COL M int., MHI:031608a1.
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relatively few integrated barrier defenses requiring
deliberate combat clearance under fire.88 Booby traps
were common, especially in and around abandoned
houses, but little of the actual combat action took
place through defended barrier systems, and massed
indirect fires on assault forces in breaching operations
were infrequent.89
The Proximity of Combatants to Civilians.
Classical guerrillas obtain much of their cover and
concealment via intermingling with innocent civilians;
classical conventional armies avoid civilians where
possible and tend to obtain cover and concealment
via terrain rather than civilian intermingling. Hence
the greater the proximity of combatants to civilians,
the greater the degree to which the actor’s methods
approximate the guerrilla extreme.
Hezbollah is often described as having used
civilians as shields in 2006, and, in fact, they made
extensive use of civilian homes as direct fire combat
positions and to conceal launchers for rocket fire into
Israel.90 Yet the villages Hezbollah used to anchor its
defensive system in southern Lebanon were largely
evacuated by the time Israeli ground forces crossed the
border on July 18. As a result, the key battlefields in the
land campaign south of the Litani River were mostly
88. MAJ Z int., MHI:031608p4.
89. LTC R int., MHI:121807p4; COL M int., MHI:031608a1;
MAJ E int., MHI:031708a1; LTC A int., MHI:121607p; 1LT B int.,
MHI:031308a2.
90. See, e.g., Erlich, The Use of Lebanese Civilians as Human
Shields; Steven Erlanger and Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “A Disciplined
Hezbollah Surprises Israel with its Training, Tactics and Weapons,”
New York Times, August 7, 2007, p. A8; “Israel’s Dilemma after
Qana,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, August 4, 2006; Blanford,
“Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess.”
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devoid of civilians, and IDF participants consistently
report little or no meaningful intermingling of
Hezbollah fighters and noncombatants. Nor is there
any systematic reporting of Hezbollah using civilians
in the combat zone as shields. The fighting in southern
Lebanon was chiefly urban, in the built-up areas of
the small to medium-size villages and towns typical
of the region. But it was not significantly intermingled
with a civilian population that had fled by the time the
ground fighting began. Hezbollah made very effective
use of local cover and concealment (see below), but this
was obtained almost entirely from the terrain—both
natural and man-made.91
The Use of Uniforms to Distinguish Combatants
from Civilians.
Classical conventional militaries use uniforms or
other distinguishing marks to differentiate combatants
from noncombatants; classical guerrillas seek to blend
in with civilians rather than to distinguish themselves
from them, and hence often wear versions of typical ci91. See, e.g., LTC A int., MHI:121607a; COL H int., MHI:121817a;
LTC R int., MHI:121807p4; COL A int., MHI:122007p; 1LT T
int., MHI:031308p2; LTC N int., MHI:031308p3; MAJ S int.,
MHI:031608p1; MAJ E int., MHI:031708a1. There are reports of
occasional exceptions. In Bint Jubayl, for example, a woman was
seen waving a white flag from what was believed to be a Hezbollahoccupied house: LTC A int., MHI:121607a. “A few women” were
spotted in At Tayyibah: LTC R int., MHI:121807p4. Some civilians
were seen in Aytarun in the early days of the war, but not later:
1LT O int., MHI:031308a1. Isolated movement by civilian vehicles
was reported in Haddatha: MAJ K int., MHI:031608p2. We heard
no accounts, however, of any significant civilian population on
any battlefield south of the Litani, or any systematic effort by
Hezbollah to exploit civilian intermingling as a shield.
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vilian clothing. Hence the greater the incidence of uniformed combatants, the greater the degree to which the
actor’s methods approximate the conventional extreme.
In 2006, the great majority of Hezbollah’s fighters
wore uniforms. In fact, their equipment and clothing
were remarkably similar to many state militaries’—
desert or green fatigues, helmets, web vests, body
armor, dog tags, and rank insignia.92 On occasion, IDF
units hesitated to fire on Hezbollah parties in the open
because their kit, from a distance, looked so much like
IDF infantry’s: at Addaisseh, seven Hezbollah fighters
were mistaken for Israelis until an IDF soldier noticed
that one of them was wearing track shoes.93 Again,
there were exceptions: at Marun ar Ras, most fighters
were seen in uniform, but some armed combatants
were also observed in civilian clothes; 2 of 20 bodies of
dead Hezbollah fighters at At Tayyibah were found in
civilian clothing; two fighters in civilian clothes were
observed at Frun, and a few more at Al Qantarah; at At
Tiri, combatants were observed in uniform pants, but
not tops.94 But the great majority of Hezbollah fighters
in 2006 were uniformed and visually distinguishable
from civilians.
92. See, e.g., LTC A int., MHI:121607a; COL H int., MHI:
121817a; LTC R int., MHI:121807p4; COL A int., MHI:122007p;
1LT B int., MHI:031308a2; MAJ K int., MHI:031608p2; LTC A
int., MHI:031608p3. Some Hezbollah fighters wore face paint for
camouflage, further differentiating themselves from civilians:
LTC R int., MHI:121807p4.
93. COL A int., MHI:122007p. Similarly, at Hill 951 at Marun ar
Ras some IDF units were hesitant to fire on Hezbollah counterattackers because the latter looked so much like Israeli infantry:
LTC N int., MHI:031308p3.
94. 1LT T int., MHI:031308p2; LTC S int., MHI:031608a2;
MAJ E int., MHI:031708a1; LTC A int., MHI:031608p3; LTC I int.,
MHI:031708p.
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HEZBOLLAH THEATER STRATEGY
AND OPERATIONS IN LEBANON, 2006
Hezbollah’s grand strategic objectives are a subject
of considerable disagreement among Western analysts. Some see Hezbollah as an absolutist institution
whose behavior reflects an uncompromising pursuit
of aims centered on the destruction of Israel and the
establishment of an Islamist theocracy across the region;
tactics may vary, reflecting the limits of the possible at
any given time, but in this view, the goals are fixed
and very demanding.95 Others see Hezbollah’s goals
themselves as more limited and pragmatic, focusing
on consolidating its political standing in Lebanese
domestic politics and modulating its conflict with
Israel as necessary to suit its internal political needs.96
Still others see Hezbollah in largely cultural terms, as
a social movement whose behavior is shaped as much
by theological or even self-expressive concerns—
95. See, e.g., Harel and Issacharoff, 34 Days, pp. 259-260; Ely
Karmon, Fight on All Fronts: Hizballah, the War on Terror, and the
War in Iraq, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East
Policy Research Memorandum No. 45, December 2003, pp. 2, 6, 1516; Eyal Zisser, “The Return of Hizbullah,” Middle East Quarterly,
Fall 2002.
96. See, e.g., Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah,
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004, pp. 80, 108-135,
144-146; Byman, “Should Hezbollah Be Next?” Foreign Affairs, Vol.
82, No. 6, November/December 2003, pp. 54-66; Byman, “Israel
and the Lebanese Hizballah,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism:
Lessons from the Past, Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, eds.,
Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2007, p. 322; Sami
G. Hajjar, Hizballah: Terrorism, National Liberation, or Menace?
Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute,
2002, p. 16; Adam Shatz, “In Search of Hezbollah,” New York
Review of Books, Vol. 51, No. 7, April 29, 2004, pp. 41-45; Judith
Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, London: I.
B. Tauris, 2004, pp. 47-48; “Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance,” Jane’s
Terrorism and Security Monitor, September 13, 2006.
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as an embodiment of a religio-cultural striving for
purification through conflict and struggle rather than
as an instrumental means to some practical political or
military end.97
For our purposes, however, the key issue is the
degree to which its strategy for the conduct of the 2006
campaign per se was consistent with a classical guerrilla
model or its conventional opposite. To establish this,
we deduce from the taxonomy above four observable
variables to be coded for the 2006 fighting:
• the balance of brute force and coercion;
• the relative concentration of combat power;
• the military organization of the theater of war;
and
• the sensitivity of dispositions to the political
orientation of the population.
The Balance of Brute Force and Coercion.
The conventional extreme at the strategic level of
war relies heavily on brute force to seize or protect the
disputed stake in the conflict without any voluntary
decision to concede on the opponent’s part. The guerrilla extreme, by contrast, is overwhelmingly coercive,
manipulating the enemy’s costs and benefits to induce
the enemy to concede a stake that it could still seize
or withhold if it chose. Coercion is widely employed,
97. See, e.g., Mona Harb and Reinoud Leenders, “Know Thy
Enemy: Hizbullah, ‘Terrorism’ and the Politics of Perception,”
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1, February 2005, pp. 189-190;
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah, Politics and Religion, London:
Pluto, 2002, p. 126; Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from
Within, Dalia Khalil, trans., London: SAQI, 2005, pp. 39-40, 4850; Dani Berkovich, Can the Hydra Be Beheaded? The Campaign to
Weaken Hizbollah, Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies,
Memorandum No. 92, 2007 [In Hebrew], pp. 15-16. For a recent
assessment of the role of culture in modern warfare generally, see
Shultz and Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias.
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even by powerful actors in chiefly conventional wars;
brute force, by contrast, is rarely encountered above
the tactical level in classical guerrilla warfare. At the
strategic level, an observation of coercive action per
se is thus a relatively weak indicator of the difference
between conventional and guerrilla methods, but
the more extensive the role of brute force in conduct
above the tactical level the greater the degree to which
the actor’s methods approximate the conventional
extreme.
Hezbollah’s military strategy in 2006, like its grand
strategy, is disputed, and its representatives’ stated
views on this are insufficient to establish the intended
role of coercion and brute force definitively. And unlike
its tactics, Hezbollah’s strategy cannot be determined
unambiguously via the IDF interview data available to
us. Its strategic intent thus cannot be observed directly.
We can, however, deduce from Hezbollah’s observed
behavior at the tactical and operational levels a strategic
logic consistent with that behavior, and exclude
otherwise plausible alternative accounts, subject to
the assumption that Hezbollah is an instrumentally
rational actor (in the minimal, Clausewitzian sense
that its actions are means to obtain political ends).
In particular, Hezbollah’s observed behavior is
consistent with a model in which a largely brute force
pattern of operational art is designed to serve largely
coercive strategic ends—a combination that falls short
of the conventional extreme, but which is very common
in great power warfare all the same. As a much weaker
actor, Hezbollah surely understood that it could not
destroy Israel or the IDF by force of arms in 2006. It
also surely realized that Israel was capable of invading
Lebanon and reestablishing or expanding upon its
pre-2000 occupation. A preeminent requirement for
any rational Hezbollah strategist would thus have
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been to design a means of deterring Israel from such
a reoccupation, or coercing it into halting one should
deterrence fail.98 In principle, a variety of means for
coercive pain infliction were available to Hezbollah;
several of these options, however—and especially
the use of suicide bombers—had been undermined
by Israel’s internal and border security policies. But
rockets, which overfly border defenses and checkpoints,
remained a powerful threat to Israeli population centers.
Ideally, long-range launchers deployed in central or
northern Lebanon would provide the needed coercive
threat from locations beyond the reach of any plausible
Israeli invasion. Long-range launchers, however, are
large, distinctive, and relatively few in number, leaving
them vulnerable to preemptive destruction by Israeli
air strikes.99 Shorter range rockets are smaller, easier
to conceal, vastly greater in number, and potentially
much less vulnerable to aerial preemption—but their
range limited them to deployment in close proximity
to the Israeli border and hence left them vulnerable to
destruction by a ground invasion. This left Hezbollah
with a dilemma: if they removed their chief coercive
weapons from the reach of the Israeli Army, they
would be vulnerable to the Israeli Air Force; if they
used weapons survivable against the Air Force, they
would be within reach of the Army.
The apparent solution to this dilemma was to rely
chiefly on short-range rockets that could be concealed
from air attack, but to protect these from ground
invasion via a Hezbollah ground defense that would
98. Note that a plan for coercive pain infliction would be
necessary even if Hezbollah calculated that a reoccupation would
serve its domestic political interests: if it ultimately failed to inflict
significant coercive pain on an Israeli occupier, its legitimacy in
the eyes of its Shiite constituency would eventually collapse.
99. As demonstrated in the 2006 campaign by Israel’s air strike
in Operation SPECIFIC GRAVITY.
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have to adopt a brute force operational doctrine of
denying the IDF access to the launch areas.100 Complete
denial would be impossible—the IDF was, and is,
too strong. But if a ground defense could hold long
enough, it would enable ongoing rocket fire in the
meantime to inflict mounting coercive pain on Israeli
society. Retaliatory Israeli airstrikes, moreover, could
be expected to inflame regional and world opinion,
placing international political pressure on Israel
to relent.101 Neither of these coercive mechanisms,
however, are quick—it takes time for political pressure
100. Some have argued that Hezbollah could solve this problem not by defending the launchers, but simply by deploying so
many of them that the IDF could not possibly destroy them all.
See, e.g., Rubin, The Rocket Campaign, pp. 26-27. It is far from clear,
however, that this offered a practical solution without a credible,
brute-force defense of southern Lebanon. To do this with longrange rockets fired from northern Lebanon, for example, would
require saturating the Israeli Air Force’s ability to destroy targets
whose size makes them relatively easy for the IAF to find. Modern,
high-technology air forces are very good at destroying exposed
targets quickly and in large numbers; to acquire more targets
than the IAF has munitions would be an extremely inefficient
solution and would require Hezbollah to field an impractically
large number of relatively scarce assets. To try this approach with
short-range rockets, by contrast, is to assume that an unchallenged
IDF ground invasion would not simply saturate the region with
so many soldiers as to enable them to find even nominally hidden
rockets quickly in large numbers. The IDF is large enough, and
southern Lebanon is small enough, to have enabled Israel to
do this if the cost of doing so were low; the whole logic of the
analysis presented below is premised on the assumed need for
Hezbollah to make this impossible by impeding the IDF’s access
to the launch areas.
101. Note that a short, intense air campaign of the kind needed to destroy Hezbollah long-range missile launchers could be
concluded before such external political pressure would get very
far. For external pressure to develop much leverage on Israel, a
sustained campaign of extended duration would be required.
Hezbollah may well have expected to profit politically from the
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to build and for leverage on Israeli decisionmakers to
mount; even a massive wave of rocket attacks would
have little coercive effect if it were a short-term spasm
with no prospect of longer-term continuation and
escalation. The key operational-level requirement was
thus to buy the time needed for the coercive campaign
to succeed—to prevent the Israelis from getting quick
access to the key launch areas on the scale needed to
search the terrain exhaustively and uproot concealed
rocket launchers before enough pressure could be built
on the Israeli government to yield the issue at stake.
This operational requirement could not be met
with classical guerrilla tactics, which allow enemy
forces into the country but gradually penalize them
for their presence with hit-and-run casualty infliction.
Hezbollah could not preserve a system of hidden
rocket launchers long enough for what might have to
be thousands of individually small warheads gradually
to build coercive pain if the IDF had ready access to the
terrain in southern Lebanon. A brief incursion by tens
of thousands of IDF soldiers might suffer a handful of
losses to guerrilla ambushes, but in the meantime, it
could roll up the entirety of Hezbollah’s primary rocket
force, end the coercive campaign against Israeli cities,
then withdraw before its own casualties became prohibitive either. So Hezbollah set about the construction of
a brute force defensive capability in southern Lebanon
that might be able to delay an Israeli invasion long
enough to enable a coercive strategy to succeed.
collateral damage inevitably associated with Israeli air operations,
but if they based their strategy on long-range missiles alone this
profit would have been slight. An ability to protract the campaign
was essential for the success of any strategy involving external
political pressure on Israel.
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This analysis is broadly consistent with some
assessments of Hezbollah’s strategy in 2006.102 But
many have argued that Hezbollah intended its ground
forces, as well as its rocket forces, to function coercively—as a classical guerrilla approach at both the strategic and the operational level in which the ground force
role was to impose pain via IDF military casualties rather than to contest control of southern Lebanon.103 And
surely Hezbollah welcomed the coercive benefit of
killing Israeli soldiers. But their observed behavior is
inconsistent with a conclusion that this was the primary mission of Hezbollah’s ground forces.
In particular, the tactics they actually employed in
2006 are much more consistent with an intention to
hold ground than they are with an assumption that
territorial control was unimportant and that their goal
was the classical guerrilla aim of attrition per se. As we
argue above, Hezbollah fighters defended positions too
long, at ranges too short, and counterattacked too often,
to square with a model of classical guerrilla intent. Nor
did they exploit the potential of civilian intermingling
in nearly the degree one would normally expect
from a classical guerrilla force. This is not to say that
Hezbollah’s operational doctrine was one of MaginotLine static defense, either—they accepted decisive engagement at some times and places but not others, they
counterattacked to regain some lost ground but not
all, they used mines and indirect fires to complement
102. In particular, Exum, Hizballah at War, p. 8; Romm, “A Test
of Rival Strategies,” pp. 58-59; Blanford, “Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess.”
103. See, e.g., Kober, “The Second Lebanon War”; Kober, “The
Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War,” pp. 3-4; Siboni,
“The Military Campaign in Lebanon,” pp. 62-63; Rubin, The Rocket
Campaign, pp. 26-27; Cody and Moore, “The Best Guerrilla Force
in the World.”

52

direct-fire territorial defenses in some places but as
harassment tools in others. And their operational level
intent appears to have been to delay rather than to
hold indefinitely. Like most real militaries, Hezbollah’s
tactics were between the extremes. But their tactics
were especially far from the guerrilla extreme. If their
intent were merely to coerce Israel through the killing
of IDF soldiers, they could have done so at much
more advantageous loss-exchange ratios (and hence
have continued such attrition longer, and killed more
Israelis with the forces available to them) if they had
not accepted decisive engagement by holding positions
so long, or if they had not attempted counterattacks, or
if they had persuaded civilians to remain under lower
intensity combat and intermingled their fighters with
the population. The tactical choices they made in 2006
are difficult to reconcile with an assumed intent to
forgo brute force on the ground in favor of a classical
guerrilla approach.
It is also possible that Hezbollah’s strategy was
the product of religio-cultural self-expression rather
than an instrumentally rational plan to counter an
Israeli threat via strategic coercion and operational
brute force. A culture of struggle and resistance can be
expressed in many ways; perhaps the observed pattern
of tactics and operations is uniquely attributable to
Hezbollah’s particular belief system and world view.
Following Lawrence, however, many have tended to
associate Arab culture with guerrilla methods rather
than conventional brute force.104 Either way, it is clear
that the ultimate result was a strategic program that at
104. See, e.g., T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, London:
Jonathan Cape, 1935, p. 224; Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,”
The Arab Bulletin, August 20, 1917; John Walter Jandora, Militarism
in Arab History, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997, pp. 4, 8-9.
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least mimicked a rationally instrumental design with
considerable fidelity.105
It is important, though, not to attribute too much
prescience or strategic foresight to Hezbollah in 2006.
At a minimum, it is known that Hassan Nasrallah and
the Hezbollah leadership were surprised by the severity
of the Israeli response to the July 12 kidnapping; they
had not anticipated this, and clearly had not intended
war on this scale in 2006.106 And it is far from clear that
the war they found themselves in served their ultimate
interests—they were widely perceived to have beaten
Israel in the immediate aftermath, but in the process
they suffered heavy military losses and their actions
also brought a great deal of suffering on Lebanese
civilians. In the longer run, this may or may not work
out to their advantage.107 Either way, the fighting that
followed the kidnapping did not follow from any
larger, integrated grand strategic plan—it emerged
more organically from a series of miscalculations on
both sides.
For Hezbollah, the 2006 campaign thus appears
to have been the product of a fairly generic plan for
the conduct of an unspecified future war with Israel,
105. For a similar argument on the apparent rationality of jihadi strategic thinking, see Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer,
“Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study
Preceding the Madrid Bombings,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
Vol. 27, No. 5, September 2004, pp. 355-375.
106. See Herb Keinon, “No Second Round Looming,” Jerusalem
Post, August 28, 2006, p. 1; Matthew Schofield and Leila Fadel,
“Regrets over Captures Aired,” Miami Herald, August 28, 2006, p.
A12.
107. For arguments that Hezbollah was not successful in the
2006 war, see Charles Krauthammer, “Hezbollah’s ‘Victory’,”
Washington Post, September 1, 2006, p. A21; Edward N. Luttwak,
“Misreading the Lebanon War,” Jerusalem Post, August 21, 2006,
p. 13; Asher Susser, “Lebanon: A Reassessment,” Jerusalem Post,
September 13, 2006, p. 15.
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which may or may not have been well-suited to the
circumstances in which they found themselves, but
could well have been the only plan available on short
notice at the time. Most state militaries develop a variety
of contingency plans for possible future conflicts,
which they work out in peacetime, well in advance of
an actual crisis, then shelve for possible future use. As
such, they cannot anticipate the political particulars
of the crisis that may bring war in any actual case.
Ideally they are updated and adapted to the situation
as it unfolds, but in Hezbollah’s case, the 2006 war
was a surprise, and Israel’s quick escalation left them
with little time for strategic adaptation. What they did
have was a generic design and a series of elaborately
prepared defensive works and rocket launch sites
developed for that design. So they used what they
had. The result was a coherent campaign at the tactical
through theater level—and one that was in many
respects more state-like and conventional than often
expected from nonstate actors—but this campaign may
or may not have ultimately served Hezbollah’s larger
grand strategic interests.
The Relative Concentration of Combat Power.
Classical guerrillas employ widely distributed
forces at low, relatively uniform, densities; classical
conventional armies operate in greater density and
concentrate differentially at particular points. Hence
the greater the relative concentration of combatants,
the greater the degree to which the actor’s methods
approximate the conventional extreme.
Hezbollah in 2006 was more concentrated than
some historical guerrilla forces, but fielded a smaller
army for a theater the size of southern Lebanon than
many historical conventional state militaries have.
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Hezbollah’s exact strength in 2006 is unknown, but
Western estimates vary from a low of around 2,000
to a high of around 7,000.108 Assuming a mid-range
figure of 4,500, and given the area of Lebanon south of
the Litani, this implies an average density of around
6 troops per square kilometer.109 By contrast, the Viet
Cong in 1964 fielded some 106,000 fighters across a
country of 170,000 square kilometers, for a density of
only one-tenth that of Hezbollah.110 On the other end
of the spectrum, the French in 1940 complemented
the Maginot Line with 75,000 troops over 1,260 square
kilometers, for a density 10 times that of Hezbollah.111
And the U.S. defense of Saudi Arabia in 1990, as noted

108. For various estimates of Hezbollah’s troop strength, see
“Hizbullah,” Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, June 26, 2007;
Erlanger and Oppel, “A Disciplined Hezbollah Surprises Israel
with Its Training, Tactics, and Weapons”; “Hizbullah’s Islamic
Resistance,” Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, September 13,
2006; Anthony H. Cordesman, Lebanese Security and the Hezbollah,
working draft, revised July 14, 2006, p. 25.
109. The area of Lebanon south of the Litani River is roughly
30 km by 25 km, or a total of 750 square kilometers. See map in
Figure 2.
110. Viet Cong troop strength from Clodfelter, Warfare and
Armed Conflicts, p. 740.
111. The Maginot Line was 140 km in length, and its
fortifications were about 4 km in depth on average. The Line
was also supported with artillery, including guns with a 27 km
maximum range. We use the standard rule of thumb that artillery
is generally positioned one-third of its range behind the front, and
thus estimate that the average total depth of the Maginot Line
defenses was 9 km. In 1940, France deployed 25 regiments of
fortress infantry to the Line, at roughly 3,000 troops per regiment,
for an estimated complement of 75,000. For these figures, see
J.E. Kaufmann, The Maginot Line: None Shall Pass, Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1997, pp. 57-58, 67, 85, 88; Vivian Rowe, Great Wall of
France: The Triumph of the Maginot Line, New York: Putnam, 1959,
p. 86.
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above, deployed a density of around 5.5 troops per
square kilometer, roughly equal to that of Hezbollah.112
The Military Organization of the Theater of War.
Classical guerrilla warfare is a relatively uniform,
undifferentiated territorial defense without a distinguishable front or rear waged by guerrillas fighting
largely where they live; classical conventional armies
differentiate the theater into distinct covering force
zones, main battle areas, rear areas and communication zones, sectors of main effort, and supporting or
economy of force areas. Hence the more uniform
or undifferentiated the military organization of the
theater of war, the greater the degree to which the
actor’s methods approximate the guerrilla extreme.
Our ability to distinguish the theater-level military
organization of southern Lebanon is limited by our
lack of access to senior Hezbollah sources. We do
know, however, that IDF ground forces entered some
areas without resistance, whereas other locations were
heavily—and apparently preferentially—defended.
Rabb ath Thalathin, for example, was entered on July
30 without opposition.113 Blida, Rshaf, Marjayoun,
Marwahin, and Kafr Kila were all entered without
receiving fire.114 By contrast, villages such as Bint
Jubayl, Marun ar Ras, Ghanduriyih, At Tayyibah,
Muhaybib, Dayr Siryan, Aytarun, Bayt Yahun, Al
Qantarah, and Markaba were all stoutly defended;
the natural approach route through the Saluqi valley
112. See Footnote 37.
113. MAJ E int., MHI:031708a1.
114. 1LT T int., MHI:031308p2; LTC A int., MHI:121607a;
MAJ J int., MHI:031508p; MAJ S int., MHI:031608p1; MAJ E int.,
MHI:031708a1.
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was manned and contested.115 Villages commanding
key road junctions in the central part of the theater
such as Bint Jubayl and Marun ar Ras were especially
heavily defended, and key terrain commanding the
approaches to these junctions, such as the Shaked
outpost overlooking Marun ar Ras, was garrisoned
and fortified.116 The southwestern sector (An Naqurah
to Ramyah), by contrast, offered less defensible terrain
and appears to have been only lightly held.117 Villages
near the border with Israel were systematically better
prepared for defense and more strongly manned than
those in the interior.118 Supplies and ammunition
were stockpiled in locations commanding key terrain;
other positions appear to have received little logistical
prepositioning.119
115. See, e.g., 1LT T int., MHI:031308p2; LTC N int., MHI:
031308p3; MAJ S int., MHI:031708a3; COL H int., MHI:121817a;
LTC R int., MHI:121807p4; LTC S int., MHI:031608a2; LTC A int.,
MHI:031608p3.
116. See, e.g., 1LT O int., MHI:031308a1; COL H int., MHI:
121817a; MAJ S int., MHI:031708a3; 1LT T int., MHI:031308p2;
LTC N int., MHI:031308p3; 1LT B int., MHI:031308a2.
117. LTC D int., MHI:121807p3; LTC A int., MHI:121607a; MAJ
S int., MHI:031608p1. Some, however, have attributed the lighter
resistance encountered in the southwest to superior IDF tactics
employed by the units operating there: MAJ J int., MHI:031508p.
118. LTC R int., MHI:121807p4.
119. In Bint Jubayl, Marun ar Ras, Muhaybib and elsewhere,
for example, extensive stocks of ammunition, weapons, food
and water were discovered, sufficient for weeks of combat
without resupply: see, e.g., LTC A int., MHI:121607a; 1LT B
int., MHI:031308a2; MAJ K int., MHI:031608p2. Bint Jubayl was
contested through the end of the campaign with no apparent
supply difficulties for the Hezbollah garrison. By contrast, Beit
Yaroun was subject to much less extensive fighting, yet by the
end of the campaign, Hezbollah fighters were observed moving
from house to house searching for food; Hezbollah supplies had
apparently run out, and no unconsumed prestocks of food or
ammunition were observed in the village following its capture:
MAJ S int., MHI:031608p1.
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Perhaps most important, Hezbollah exercised a
degree of hierarchical, differentiated command and
control over subunits operating in key areas during the
campaign, making apparent decisions to favor some
sectors over others, hold in some places but yield in
others, counterattack in some locations but withdraw
elsewhere. A formal chain of command operated from
designated and well-equipped command posts; used
real time communications systems including landline
cables and encrypted radio; issued orders; changed
plans; and moved some elite units over considerable
distances from rearward reserve areas to reinforce
the key battle for the communications network in the
central sector.120 (See Figures 3 and 4.)

Credit: IDF.

Figure 3. Captured Hezbollah Communications
Equipment, including Encryption Systems.

120. See, e.g., LTC N int., MHI:031308p3; MAJ J int., MHI:
031508p; COL M int., MHI:031608a1; MAJ K int., MHI:031608p2;
MAJ E int., MHI:031708a1; COL H int., MHI:121817a; LTC S
int., MHI:031608a2; LTC A int., MHI:031608p. Hezbollah also
appears to have devoted considerable effort to intercepting IDF
communications, though it is unclear whether they proved able
to exploit any such intercepts: MAJ S int., MHI:031608p1; COL M
int., MHI:031608a1; MAJ K int., MHI:031608p2.
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Credit: IDF.

Figure 4. Hezbollah Outpost along the LebaneseIsraeli Border.
The scale of differentiation and articulation should
not be exaggerated—much of the Hezbollah defense
was static; reserve movements were very small scale;
Hezbollah commanders rarely succeeded in adapting
to changing conditions quickly or responsively; and
Hezbollah’s limited freedom to maneuver under
Israeli air supremacy made any large-scale integration
for mobile defense at the theater level impossible even
if Hezbollah would have attempted this otherwise. But
neither were their dispositions in southern Lebanon an
undifferentiated territorial defense without distinctions
between front and rear, or main effort and economy
of force; the theater of war was clearly articulated
for military purposes into differentiated sectors of
operations with distinctions in emphasis and role.
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The Sensitivity of Dispositions to the Political
Orientation of the Population.
Classical guerrillas require logistical support and
safe haven from a sympathetic population to fight
effectively; classical conventional armies maintain
specialized logistical systems separate and distinct
from the population and the civil economy. Hence
the greater the degree to which any nonuniformities
in combat dispositions correlate with ethnic, sectarian,
or other political demographic distinctions, the greater
the degree to which the actor’s methods approximate
the guerrilla extreme.
Again, there are limits to what can be known, in this
case due partly to the absence of interview evidence
from Hezbollah senior leadership and partly due to
limitations in what can be known about the sectarian
and political demography of southern Lebanon. The
latter is politically very sensitive, hence no census has
been conducted in the region since 1932.
Nevertheless, there is some reason to believe that
Hezbollah’s dispositions and performance may have
been influenced by the political orientation of the
local population, and especially by the geographic
distribution of Christians and Shiites. Historically, the
northeastern sector near Metulla and Marjayoun had
been heavily Christian, whereas the central part of
the theater around Bint Jubayl and Marun ar Ras had
been predominantly Shiite. Although there were some
Hezbollah defenses in the northeast, this sector was
less heavily defended than elsewhere.121 This may have
reflected the difficulties in making systematic defensive
preparations amid an unsupportive population—
121. MAJ S int., MHI:031608p1; COL M int., MHI:031608a1;
MAJ E int., MHI:031708a1.
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and especially, in keeping those preparations covert
and hidden from Israeli intelligence and target
acquisition.122 By the same token, however, most
Lebanese villages were evacuated prior to the IDF’s
arrival, which would have enabled Hezbollah fighters
to dispose themselves for combat without observation
by any significant Christian civilian population even
in the northeast. It is also unclear whether the inherent
military value of the northeast for Hezbollah equaled
that of the central region, with its critical road network
and closer proximity to the major Israeli coastal cities to
the southwest. The relationship between Hezbollah’s
conduct of the campaign and the political demography
of southern Lebanon is thus unclear, but it is difficult
to exclude some possibility of a connection.
HEZBOLLAH PROFICIENCY OF EXECUTION
IN LEBANON, 2006
A final important distinction concerns Hezbollah’s
proficiency of execution. Inept performance is possible
whether one attempts conventional or guerrilla
methods; the former, however, is especially hard to do
well without a great deal of specialized and perishable
skills. Guerrillas, too, benefit from skilled execution,
but guerrillas can get by with simple, unsophisticated
hit-and-run methods that can be executed with
minimal training. Competent conventional warfare at
the theater level demands intensive training, especially
for the coordination and synchronization of large-scale
maneuver. An important reason for the commonplace
intuition that nonstate actors cannot wage conventional
warfare and will resort to irregular methods instead is
122. MAJ J int., MHI:031508p.
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the expectation that the former demands skills beyond
the reach of any but wealthy state militaries. Any
organization can attempt to execute the conventional
tactics and operational art often associated with
interstate warfare; to do so proficiently, by contrast, is
much more difficult.

Credit: IDF.

Figure 5. Hezbollah Bunker Entrance.
Hezbollah’s proficiency of execution in 2006 was
uneven. Some things were done very well. The selection, layout, and concealment of fighting positions,
for example, were systematically very effective. IDF
attackers were rarely able to identify Hezbollah combat
positions prior to drawing fire from them, even from
very short ranges. In Dayr Siryan, Israeli infantry
approached to within 50-100 meters of Hezbollah
fighters without spotting them; in Aytarun, tanks
passed directly beneath the windows used to fire upon
them without seeing the defenders first; in Bint Jubayl,
defensive positions in buildings were still invisible to
infantry advancing up directly adjoining streets; in At
Tayyibah, Hezbollah defenders opened fire undetected
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from a range of 50 meters.123 Movement among alternate and supplementary positions within buildings
often enabled urban defenders to remain concealed
even after extended firing; especially in villages near
the Israeli border, tunnels were dug between buildings
to facilitate concealed movement.124 In the border area,
combat preparations initiated years before the war
resulted in civilian homes whose very construction
was influenced by military tactical considerations:
buildings in key locations were discovered with thicker,
reinforced walls on the sides facing likely approach
routes from Israel.125 Other indoor combat positions
near the border had sandbags or other reinforcements
hidden in the interior to strengthen walls facing
intended engagement areas.126 Outdoor and rural
123. COL A int., MHI:122007p; 1LT Y int., MHI:031308p1;
MAJ S int., MHI:031708a3; LTC S int., MHI:031608a2. For other
examples from Bint Jubayl, Marun ar Ras, Mays al Jabal, Aytarun,
and elsewhere, see, e.g., COL H int., MHI:121817a; LTC R int.,
MHI:121807p4; 1LT T int., MHI:031308p2; 1LT O int., MHI:031308a1;
MAJ Z int., MHI:031608p4; LTC A int., MHI:031608p3. Of course,
there were exceptions. In Haddatha, IDF intelligence learned of a
Hezbollah position and a ground unit then spotted them moving
around in a building: 1LT T int., MHI:031308p2. In Bayt Yahun,
IDF ground forces identified a Sagger position in a house, and
one mobile Sagger outdoors, and killed both before the crews
realized they had been seen: MAJ S int., MHI:031608p1. In
Ghanduriyih, many positions were concealed, but some could
be identified prior to contact: cf. LTC R int., MHI:121807p4, and
LTC A int., MHI:031608p3. But these exceptions were unusual. In
most engagements, Hezbollah defenders got the first shot from
positions that had not been identified beforehand.
124. See, e.g., LTC A int., MHI:121607a; LTC R int., MHI:
121807p4.
125. At Bint Jubayl, for example, reinforced walls facing the
Israeli border remained standing after the rest of the structures
had been destroyed: 1LT B int., MHI:031308a2.
126. See, e.g., COL H int., MHI:121817a; LTC A int., MHI:121607a;
LTC R int., MHI:121807p4; LTC N int., MHI:031308p3. Note that
while there is some evidence of similar preparations elsewhere
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positions were sometimes very elaborately prepared,
with concrete dugouts, multiple chambers, concealed
entry and exit points, and carefully camouflaged
firing positions; illustrative examples are depicted
in Figures 5 to 7.127 Antitank missile positions were
especially difficult to locate, given the often extended
range of ATGM engagements and Hezbollah’s success
at concealing launchers and crews (see Figure 8).128
Terminal defenses for rural Katyusha rocket launch
areas, dubbed “nature preserves” by the IDF, were
especially intricate, well-camouflaged, and carefully
prepared—sometimes including hydraulically raised
and lowered launch tubes, concrete-reinforced caches,
showers for garrisons, multiple entrances and exits,
and interconnected outworks to enable concealed
movement within the system (see Figures 9 to 11).129

(for Ghanduriyih, for example; see LTC R int., MHI:121807p4),
interior positions in villages remote from the border were typically
less extensively prepared: see, e.g., COL A int., MHI:122007p; MAJ
K int., MHI:031608p2. Even some border-area positions appear
to have been more hastily prepared, as with some buildings at
Marun ar Ras (1LT T int., MHI:031308p2; or Mays al Jabal, cf. LTC
R int., MHI:121807p4 and MAJ E int., MHI:031708a1), and in few
cases were even better-prepared buildings fitted with loopholes,
razor wire, or interior obstacles; Hezbollah urban defensive
techniques were thus variable across the theater, and often not as
extensive as in some other historical urban warfare—though the
net results typically afforded Hezbollah defenders very effective
concealment prior to, and often subsequent to, the exchange of
fire.
127. See, e.g., 1LT O int., MHI:031308a1; LTC A int., MHI:
121607a.
128. See, e.g., 1LT O int., MHI:031308a3; COL M int., MHI:
031608a1; MAJ Z int., MHI:031608p4; 1LT Y int., MHI:031308p1;
MAJ E int., MHI:031708a2.
129. LTC D int., MHI:121807p3.
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Credit: IDF.

Figure 6. Hezbollah Bunker Entrance.

Source: Reuven Erlich, The Use of Lebanese Civilians as Human
Shields, Gelilot: Center for Special Studies/Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center, 2006, p. 42.

Figure 7. Hezbollah Outdoor Firing Position.
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Source: Reuven Erlich, The Use of Lebanese Civilians as Human
Shields, Gelilot: Center for Special Studies/Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center, 2006, p. 92.

Figure 8. Hezbollah Kornet ATGM Position
at Ghanduriyih.
Note that when loaded for firing, the missile would be fixed in
a launch tube just above the guidance package shown; only the
optics and the tube would be visible above the mask, providing
an exposed cross section of under two feet square to be detected
by targets multiple kilometers away.

Credit: IDF.

Figure 9. Hezbollah Rocket Launcher in Concealed
Rural Position.
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Credit: IDF.

Figure 10. Hezbollah Bunker Interiors.

Credit: IDF.

Figure 11. Hezbollah Bunker Entrance Stairs.
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Hezbollah fire discipline was strong and consistent.
Engagements were typically initiated by Hezbollah
with coordinated, concentrated fire from multiple
locations. Defenders routinely allowed lead echelons
to pass, opening fire on follow-on elements once larger
formations had advanced into kill zones; locations were
rarely given away by premature firing from nervous
individuals.130
Hezbollah effectively coordinated direct fires in
support of its counterattacks, often from multiple
directions.131 Barriers and overwatching ATGM
positions were sometimes integrated with considerable
skill over multikilometer distances: east of Ghanduriyih, for example, a series of minefields were placed in
locations that canalized Israeli columns into engagement
areas exposed to ATGM fire from concealed launchers
located north of the Litani River some five kilometers
away.132 And Hezbollah mortar fire was consistently
accurate and responsive.133
Other things were done much less well. In particular, Hezbollah demonstrated no ability to control
or coordinate the maneuver of large formations.
Counterattacks, for example, never exceeded platoon
strength, and many were considerably smaller, with
individual maneuver elements sometimes as small as
3-5 soldiers; deliberate retrograde movements were
130. See, e.g., LTC D int., MHI:121807p3; 1LT O int., MHI:
031308a1; COL H int., MHI:121817a.
131. See, e.g., COL H int., MHI:121817a; MAJ S int., MHI:
031708a3; 1LT B int., MHI:031308a2; LTC N int., MHI:031308p3;
MAJ K int., MHI:031608p2.
132. COL M int., MHI:031608a1.
133. See, e.g., LTC A int., MHI:121607a; LTC R int., MHI:
121807p4; 1LT O int., MHI:031308a1; LTC A int., MHI:031608p3;
MAJ E int., MHI:031708a1 (though some felt Hezbollah’s mortar
marksmanship, though good, was actually stronger in the 1990s:
COL H int., MHI:121817a).
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normally limited to handfuls of combatants at a time;
small detachments often fought isolated actions; and
whereas perhaps 60-100 commandos were moved
over great distances, no large reserve was withheld
or maneuvered to counterconcentrate against IDF
movements, and movements of Hezbollah forces
within their forward defenses were small-scale and
over short distances.134 This should be kept in context:
the entire size of the Hezbollah combatant force in
southern Lebanon was probably well under 7,000, or
less than the strength of two U.S. Army brigades—
hence battalion- or brigade-size maneuver would be
unrealistic. But the scale of maneuver attempted by
Hezbollah in Lebanon was nonetheless very small by
Western standards.135
Hezbollah demonstrated only limited combined
arms cooperation. They frequently used ATGMs in
concert with small arms and heavy machine guns in
direct fire, and they made significant use of mortars—
but rarely were direct and indirect fires combined
against single targets or in single engagement areas.
There were exceptions: at Bint Jubayl, for example, a
Hezbollah counterattack combined direct fire support
with suppressive indirect fire from remotely located
mortars, which continued as Hezbollah ground forces
advanced; at At Tayyibah on July 28-29, IDF units
simultaneously received ATGM and mortar fire, each
from ranges of multiple kilometers; at Ghanduriyih,
IDF attackers similarly received simultaneous ATGM
and mortar fire; the Israeli advance through the Saluqi
134. COL H int., MHI:121817a; COL M int., MHI:031608a1;
1LT B int., MHI:031308a2; LTC N int., MHI:031308p3; LTC S int.,
MHI:031608a2; MAJ K int., MHI:031608p2.
135. The authors are indebted to Yuri M. Zhukov for this
observation. On Hezbollah troop strength in southern Lebanon,
see note 107 above.
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valley had to clear minefields under ATGM fire.136 Such
exceptions were uncommon, however. And Hezbollah
showed no ability to orchestrate mines, obstacles, direct
and indirect fire in a single, synchronized defense, or
to do so over any extended defensive front.137
Few Hezbollah units showed much apparent ability
to react to changing conditions. Counterattackers taken
under surprise fire from previously concealed IDF
positions away from the assault objective, for example,
often halted and fell back in disorder rather than
reorienting to the new threat, redirecting suppressive
fire, and continuing the advance. Where Hezbollah
organized linear defenses these were often flanked
by Israeli attackers; the defenders, however, typically
either fought on in the same positions or simply
withdrew, rather than forming a new front to meet the
assault. Although Hezbollah made apparent attempts
to monitor Israeli communications networks, some of
which (such as medical evacuation nets) operated in
the clear, there is no evidence they were able to exploit
any information gained.138
Hezbollah direct fire marksmanship was very uneven. Small arms fire, for example, was systematically inaccurate and caused few casualties.139 Hezbollah
ATGM crews, by contrast, could strike targets from
extraordinary ranges: Israeli armored vehicles were
regularly hit by missiles fired from 4-5 kilometers away.
136. COL H int., MHI:121817a; LTC S int., MHI:031608a2; 1LT
O int., MHI:031308a3; COL M int., MHI:031608a1.
137. See, e.g., MAJ K int., MHI:031608p2; LTC N int., MHI:
031308p3; LTC A int., MHI:121607p; 1LT B int., MHI:031308a2;
MAJ E int., MHI:031708a2; 1LT O int., MHI:031308a3.
138. See, e.g., 1LT B int., MHI:031308a2; LTC A int., MHI:
121607a; COL H int., MHI:121817a.
139. See, e.g., MAJ J int., MHI:031508p; LTC R int.,
MHI:121807p4.
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Hezbollah frequently fired such missiles in salvos at
single targets, however, and IDF armored vehicles
normally maneuvered evasively and used smoke
for obscuration once under attack. The result of this
combination was that the ratio of ATGM hits to total
launches could be very low. In the Saluqi valley fighting,
missiles were fired in volleys of perhaps a dozen rounds
at a time, of which 1-2 would hit their targets; an IDF
combat engineering battalion in Ghanduriyih received
6-8 ATGM launches while maneuvering at night with
no hits; on the night of August 12 outside At Tayyibah,
a formation of more than 15 tanks received over a dozen
Kornets fired from the village of Yuhmur, north of the
Litani River roughly five kilometers away, suffering
three hits, all of them against stationary vehicles—no
moving targets were hit; in another engagement at At
Tayyibah, one of a volley of four Saggers hit an IDF D9
armored bulldozer; the survivors popped smoke, but
Hezbollah continued firing without further success.140
The net result was a potentially lethal threat, but a very
large expenditure of missiles per target struck.141
140. 1LT O int., MHI:031308a3; MAJ Z int., MHI:031608p4;
MAJ E int., MHI:031708a2.
141. Some sources have estimated hit rates as low as 8 percent
of all missiles fired for Hezbollah ATGMs: Ben-David, “ATGM
Threat Poses Quandry for IDF Armour,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
August 16, 2006; Blanche, “Hizbullah ATGMs Take Heavy Toll in
Lebanon,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, September 1, 2006. Estimated
penetration rates per hit as reported in public sources vary from
20-45 percent: Erlanger and Oppel, “A Disciplined Hezbollah
Surprises Israel with its Training, Tactics and Weapons,” BenDavid, “Israeli Armour Fails to Protect MBTs from ATGMs,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 30, 2006. On balance, the result was
low per-round efficiency, but high aggregate lethality, accounting
for over 50 of the IDF’s 119 fatalities: Blanford, “Deconstructing
Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess.”
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Hezbollah in 2006 thus conformed to neither
ideal model. It was not a classical guerrilla army: it
put too much emphasis on holding ground; it sought
concealment chiefly via terrain rather than through
civilian intermingling; its forces were too concentrated;
and it appears to have articulated a differentiated
theater of war for the purpose of defending rocket
launch sites to be used in a strategic bombing campaign
against Israeli population centers. But neither did it
approximate a pure conventional extreme: its defense
of ground was too yielding; it relied too extensively on
harassing fires and unattended minefields; it put too
much emphasis on coercion; and it may have disposed
its forces too much in accordance with the population’s
political orientation.
But few real militaries conform perfectly to either
classical ideal. The real issue is always their relative
placement on a continuum. And Hezbollah’s position
on the guerrilla-conventional continuum in 2006 was
much closer to the conventional end of the scale than
nonstate actors are normally expected to be. In fact,
Hezbollah was in many ways as “conventional” as
some state actors have been in major interstate warfare.
Hezbollah’s relative emphasis on coercion was no
greater, for example, than the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s (NATO) in 1999, Japan’s in 1944, Nazi
Germany’s in 1944, or Wilhelmine Germany’s in 1917;
in military terms, Hezbollah’s use of a ground force to
secure base areas for the projection of strategic bombing
into an enemy homeland is similar in certain respects
to the U.S. island-hopping campaign in the Pacific in
World War II, in which U.S. Army and Marine ground
forces were used to secure runways from which bombers
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could strike Japanese cities.142 Hezbollah’s emphasis
on ground force delay to enable such strategic strikes
to secure its stakes bears a strong family resemblance
to NATO’s Cold War strategy of delaying a Soviet
conventional invasion long enough for NATO nuclear
escalation to coerce a halt to the attack.143 Hezbollah’s
lack of sizeable reserves and heavy allocation of forces
to forward, prepared defenses are similar to Germany’s
dispositions on the Seventh Army front opposite the
U.S. offensive in Operation COBRA of July 1944: much
as the German Commanding General Paul Hausser
assumed that extensive reserve movement would be
futile given Allied command of the sky, so Hezbollah
appears to have concluded that Israeli air supremacy
mandated a heavy allocation of effort to fixed defenses
of key urban road junctions near the Israeli border.144
None of this is to afford to Hezbollah the moral
or political legitimacy of NATO during the Cold War
142. Obviously there are many differences, too: U.S. forces
were on the tactical offensive in the Pacific, Hezbollah was mostly
on the tactical defensive; the Pacific campaign was amphibious
and maritime, the 2006 fighting was continental; the U.S. campaign
occurred in a war begun by an expansionist Japan, the Hezbollah
campaign was waged in a war started by a Hezbollah kidnapping
of Israeli soldiers on Israeli soil; and so on. But both campaigns
involved the use of ground forces to secure bases for aerial
coercion of an opponent via attacks on enemy cities, a concept not
normally associated with guerrilla warfare. On the Pacific island
hopping campaign, see, e.g., Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines
and Amphibious War: Its Theory and Practice in the Pacific, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1951.
143. See, e.g., David Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas,
Washington, DC: Brookings, 1983; J. Michael Legge, Theater
Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response, Santa
Monica: RAND, 1983, RAND R-2964-FF.
144. On German defenses opposite Operation COBRA, see
Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, Washington, DC: Office
of the Chief of Military History, 1961, pp. 224-228, and Map V.
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or the United States in World War II. But the military
means Hezbollah used to pursue its ends in 2006 bore
closer resemblance to state practices than many have
supposed.
In fact, in many ways the greatest divergence
between Hezbollah’s military behavior in 2006 and
that assumed for great power militaries in interstate
warfare may have been the proficiency with which
Hezbollah executed its doctrine, rather than the
doctrine it was trying to execute. Hezbollah did some
things well, such as its use of cover and concealment, its
preparation of fighting positions, its fire discipline and
mortar marksmanship, and its coordination of direct
fire support. But it also fell far short of contemporary
Western standards in controlling large-scale maneuver,
integrating movement and indirect fire support,
combining multiple combat arms, reacting flexibly to
changing conditions, and small-arms marksmanship.
Hezbollah appears to have attempted a remarkably
conventional system of tactics and theater operational
art, but there is a difference between trying and
achieving, and in 2006 at least, Hezbollah’s reach in
some ways exceeded its grasp.
Yet Hezbollah is hardly alone in this. Many state
actors have fallen far short of today’s Western standards
of military proficiency, both in today’s world and
historically. Saddam’s “elite” Iraqi state Republican
Guard, for example, proved systematically incapable
of integrating movement and indirect fire support,
combining multiple combat arms, reacting flexibly to
changing conditions, and consistently hitting targets
with either small or large caliber weapons; in two wars
with the United States, the Iraqi state military’s use of
cover and concealment, combat position preparation,
and fire discipline were consistently far less proficient
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than Hezbollah’s.145 The Italian state military in 1941
proved much less proficient in conventional warfare
than did Hezbollah in 2006; French defenses on the
critical Sedan front in 1940 were more exposed and
no more able to react to changing conditions than
Hezbollah’s.146 The Egyptian state military proved
systematically less adept than Hezbollah in cover
and concealment and little better than Hezbollah in
coordinating large scale maneuver with combined
arms or flexibly responding to changing conditions in
1956 or 1967; the Syrian state military did no better in
1967, 1973, or 1982.147 In fact, Hezbollah inflicted more
Israeli casualties per Arab fighter in 2006 than did any
of Israel’s state opponents in the 1956, 1967, 1973, or
1982 Arab-Israeli interstate wars.148 Hezbollah’s skills
145. See, esp., Stephen Biddle, “Speed Kills: Reevaluating the
Role of Speed, Precision, and Situation Awareness in the Fall of
Saddam,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, February 2007,
pp. 3-46; idem., “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells
Us About the Future of Conflict,” International Security, Vol. 21,
No. 2, Fall 1996, pp. 139-179.
146. See, e.g., ISO Playfair et al., The Mediterranean and Middle
East, Vol. I: The Early Successes against Italy, London: Her Majesty’s
Stationery Office, 1954; Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray,
Military Effectiveness, Vol. III: The Second World War, London:
Unwin Hyman, 1991, pp. 136-179; Robert Doughty, The Breaking
Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940, Hamden, CT: Archon,
1990, p. 103-165; Florian Rothbrust, Guderian’s XIXth Panzer Corps
and the Battle of France, New York: Praeger, 1990.
147. See, e.g., Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War: Military
Effectiveness, 1948-1991, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
2002; Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, The Lessons
of Modern War: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989, Boulder, CO:
Westview, 1990.
148. Assuming 2006 Israeli casualty and Hezbollah strength
figures documented above, with strength and casualty figures
for 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982 drawn from J. David Singer and
Melvin Small, Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War
Data, 1816-1992 [Computer File], Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1994.
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in conventional war fighting were clearly imperfect
in 2006—but they were also well within the observed
bounds of other state military actors in the Middle East
and elsewhere, and significantly superior to many such
states’.
Overall, then, Hezbollah’s combination of methods
and proficiency places them well to the right of the
classical guerrilla model in Figure 1. While they were
less “conventional” than, for example, the U.S. defense
of Saudi Arabia in 1990, they were probably not
significantly less so than other Arab state militaries in
Middle Eastern warfare; in terms of their net proficiency,
they may well have been at least as adept at holding
ground, for example, as some European militaries in
the 20th century world wars (such as 1940 France or
1941 Italy). On balance, Hezbollah’s behavior in 2006
thus places them within a band that includes many
state militaries in interstate warfare.
In this sense Hezbollah may be part of a broader
emerging trend. A number of nonstate actors have
recently displayed military behaviors that appear to
incorporate major elements of traditionally “conventional” methods. Al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan,
for example, made effective use of terrain and manmade works for cover and concealment at Bai Beche
and the Shah-i-Kot valley in 2001-02, where they
attempted to hold ground against a Coalition offensive
in the context of a differentiated theater of war, as did
Chechen infantry in Grozny in 1994-95.149 Rwandan
149. Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare:
Implications for Army and Defense Policy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2002, pp. 2649; idem, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare,” Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 82, No. 2, March/April 2003, pp. 31-46; Olga Oliker, Russia’s
Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat, Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2003; Timothy L. Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny,
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rebels in 1994 launched a major offensive that swept
government forces from power in about 3 months of
combat using methods that some have compared to
U.S. Army doctrine for conventional theater warfare.150
Slovenian, Bosnia, Serbian, and Croatian separatists in
the Balkans used uniformed, conventionally-equipped
formations to take and hold ground in the 1990s.151
More broadly still, a conception of military behavior
as a continuum between guerrilla and conventional
extremes with most real cases in between implies a
more complex, and more challenging, defense planning
problem than many transformation advocates assume.
The very choice of the term “transformation” implies
a need for radical change. And the nature of this
radical change usually amounts to a restructuring of
the military around a more perfect response to single
points on this spectrum.
The original case for high-tech “transformation”
as advocated by former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, for example, amounted to a program for
restructuring around the demands of the classically
conventional extreme. That is, the standoff precision
strike capabilities on which this program centered
Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat,” Parameters, Vol. 29, No.
2, Summer 1999; Thomas, “The 31 December 1994—8 February
1995 Battle for Grozny,” in William G. Robertson and Lawrence
A. Yates, eds., Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations,
Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College Press, 2003.
150. Defense Intelligence Agency Report, “Rwanda: The
Rwandan Patriotic Front’s Offensive”, May 9, 1994 [accessed at
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050994.pdf on May
8, 2008]; Donald Jameson, “Missing Pieces of the Rwanda Puzzle,”
Washington Times, May 23, 1994, A20; Donatella Lorch, “Rwanda
Rebels: Army of Exiles Fights for a Home,” New York Times, June
9, 1994, A10.
151. See, esp., Office of Russian and European Analysis, Balkan
Battlegrounds, A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995,
2 vols., Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002.
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would be very effective against opponents who present
massed targets maneuvering in large formations away
from populated areas—in fact, against this kind of
enemy, a U.S. force built around standoff precision
would be the optimal solution. If the enemy fights
this way, to retain large numbers of U.S. dismounted
infantry, heavy armor, short-range tube artillery,
and other traditional, lower-technology means for
close combat would be both less necessary and less
tolerable, given their great expense and hence their
high opportunity cost against the acquisition of the
information infrastructure needed to implement
“network-centric” standoff warfare. To retain these
artifacts of an older style of fighting represented an
unacceptable drain on resources, which would reduce
the U.S. military’s real combat power against the kind
of classically conventional enemy that the high-tech
transformation school typically assumed.152
152. On the high-tech transformation agenda, see, e.g.,
Donald Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs,
May/June 2002; idem, FY 2007 Defense Budget Statement Before
the Senate Appropriations Committee-Defense Subcommittee, May 17,
2006, available at www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2006/sp2006051713063.html; Richard Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas Griffith
Jr., “Winning With Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan
Model,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3, Winter 2006, pp. 124160; Michael Vickers and Robert Martinage, Revolution in War,
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2004; Brigadier General David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations:
Change in the Nature of Warfare, Arlington, VA: Aerospace
Education Foundation, 2001; Max Boot, “The New American Way
of War,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 4, July/August 2003, pp. 41-58;
Jim Mannion, “Rumsfeld Rejects Case for Boosting Size of Army,”
Washington Times, August 6, 2003; Rowan Scarborough, “Decisive
Force Now Measured by Speed,” Washington Times, May 7, 2003;
Michael Vickers, The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the FY
2003 Defense Budget Request and the Way Ahead for Transformation:
Meeting the “Rumsfeld Test,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Analysis, June 19, 2002.
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But this assumed behavior is a very narrow subset of
the range of possibilities, and not necessarily the most
likely subset, either. Real enemies often display a blend
of classically conventional and more “guerrilla-like”
methods. In particular, many real opponents adopt
more dispersed, less concentrated, and less exposed
defensive dispositions. This may reduce their ability to
halt an attack in its tracks at its line of departure, but,
in exchange, it provides greater survivability against
modern firepower and offers a chance to halt an
invasion in depth after an extended period of delay and
attrition. Methods of this kind have demonstrated their
value against high-firepower opponents repeatedly
over the course of modern military history; in fact, the
history of tactics and doctrine since 1900 is arguably
a story of the gradual discovery of the value of such
methods, the spread of this discovery, and its periodic
return after episodes of heterodox experimentation.153
As recently as 2002 in Afghanistan’s Shah-i-Kot valley,
such methods again proved their utility in reducing
the lethality of even 21st century high-firepower,
standoff precision strike technology.154 In fact the
utility, persistence, and transnational nature of this
intermediate approach to war fighting has led one of
us to term it the “modern system,” and to argue that it
has been essential to battlefield success and failure for
over a century of military experience.155
To cope with modern-system opponents who
use a blend of classically “guerrilla” and classically
“conventional” methods, however, requires forces
able to close with and defeat opponents whose cover
43.

153. This is the central thesis of Biddle, Military Power.
154. See Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare, pp. 24155. Biddle, Military Power, pp. 2-3.
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and concealment make them impossible to destroy
at standoff ranges. The legacy military the United
States inherited from the Cold War afforded a mix of
capabilities—both standoff fires and traditional infantry, armor, and artillery—that enabled it to combine
fire and movement and overcome even opponents
who mastered enough of the modern system to survive
standoff fires alone. This mix of capabilities offered
better performance against a modern-system opponent
than a revolution in military affairs (RMA) force
could provide, but would be less efficient against an
exposed, nonmodern-system enemy such as Saddam’s
Republican Guard. The Republican Guard’s exposure
meant it could be destroyed by either kind of American
military—the legacy force it faced in 1991, or a putative
RMA alternative built around standoff precision—but
the latter could do so faster, from safer distances, and
with smaller U.S. forces. To gain these efficiencies
against exposed, massed enemies at the “conventional”
extremum, however, the RMA agenda would accept
greatly reduced performance against modern system
enemies operating nearer the center of the spectrum in
Figure 1. Hence the Rumsfeld transformation agenda
amounted to a shift away from a legacy force that was
optimized against something like a modern system
enemy but which had substantial residual capability
against an exposed “conventional extreme” enemy to
a force focused almost preclusively on the latter.
Today, the new transformation thesis prescribes
policies very different than Rumsfeld’s, but its approach is similar: it would reoptimize the legacy military
around a different point on the military behavior spectrum. In particular, much of the policy agenda associated with the new, low-tech approach to transformation
aims to adapt the military to a threat that is expected to
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be profoundly intermingled with a civilian population,
largely indistinguishable from it, largely uninterested
in holding ground, very widely dispersed, heavily
reliant on roadside bombs, mines, booby traps and
other tools for gradual attrition of an occupation force
rather than pitched battle, and oriented chiefly toward
slow political coercion via the accumulation of cost and
unfavorable publicity rather than the use of brute force
per se. The low-tech transformation school’s preferred
tactics, for example, place a premium on restricting
the use of violence and distinguishing necessary
from unnecessary acts of force; on persistent, widely
distributed dismounted presence; and on population
control and direct, close interaction with host nation
civilians. Its modernization prescriptions emphasize
light wheeled vehicles designed for protection against
mines and roadside bombs in urban environments.
And its organizational and force design prescriptions
favor specialties such as military police, civil affairs,
military advisory, and special forces, and a buildup of
deployable expeditionary civilian interagency capacity, over branches such as armor, artillery, combat
engineers, or mechanized infantry.156
These prescriptions would indeed improve U.S.
military performance against classical guerrilla opponents. But they would also reduce it against other opponents who adopt a more intermediate position on the
military behavioral spectrum.
Some military fundamentals would apply equally
regardless: whomever it expects to fight, the U.S. Army
will need to train for safe, accurate small arms marksmanship, disciplined control of fires and use of
communications, secure movement in urban
environments, first aid, casualty evacuation, and
156. See the references in note 6 above.
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a range of other basic skills. But not all skills are
readily transferable across modes of warfare or kinds
of opponent. As the new Army and Marine Corps
counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes, an important
subset of tactics, techniques, and procedures that are
essential for effectiveness in battle against uniformed
opponents who stand and fight in defense of ground
are actively counterproductive against enemies who
melt into the population and rely on hit-and-run
sniping, ambush, roadside bombs, and assassinations
instead.157 In general, the techniques for rapid decisive
application of firepower that are often crucial to survival against “conventional” opponents tend to create
more problems than they solve in counterinsurgency.
Methods such as large-scale combined arms maneuver, tight synchronization of movement and indirect
fire support, tank gunnery from moving platforms,
evasive movement drills for armored vehicles, passage
of lines, assault breach of barrier systems, or opposed
river crossings, to name just a few, play limited roles in
counterinsurgency or counterguerrilla warfare.
Similarly, some equipment requirements cut
across mission types and warfare styles, but others
do not. Some form of protected mobility, for example,
is essential regardless; rotary wing transportation
and precision fire support are essential regardless;
unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance and
strike are increasingly valuable whoever the opponent.
But other modernization programs are less broadly
applicable: lightly armored wheeled vehicles designed
chiefly for protection against roadside bombs in
157. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Washington, DC:
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, pp. I-148 to I-157;
see also Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, John Nagl,
“Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,”
Military Review, March/April 2006, pp. 2-6.
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urban patrolling, for example, would be much less
useful for leading an opposed advance against longrange ATGMs up a rural approach route such as the
Saluqi valley in Lebanon. And whereas combat unit
organizations such as infantry brigades are broadly
applicable across a variety of missions and opponents,
others, such as large-scale military police, civil affairs,
or military advisor formations are more specialized for
conflicts against classical guerrilla opponents and less
capable in classical conventional warfare.
Real tradeoffs are thus unavoidable. There are only
so many training hours in a day, there are only so
many soldiers in the Army, and there is only so much
money in the Defense budget. If the Army chooses to
spend training time on assault breaches of defended
minefields, this is time it cannot spend improving
soldiers’ ability to prevent escalation of violence at
an urban checkpoint. If the Army chooses to expand
the military police and create a new military advisory
corps, the people involved will not be serving in tank
battalions. If the United States spends money on Mine
Resistant Armor Protected (MRAP) vehicles, this
money will not be spent on main battle tanks. It is
impossible in the real world of constrained resources
and finite time to excel at everything simultaneously.
If the U.S. military actually tries to be “pentathletes,”
as former Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker
famously put it,158 then it is going to have to accept
that in real wars against single-event specialists, it may
not produce a gold-medal-equivalent performance:
pentathletes rarely, if ever, win Olympic gold in any
of the single events that make up the pentathlon.
158. Sally Donnelly and Douglas Waller, “Ten Questions for
General Schoomaker,” Time, April 22, 2005; Lieutenant Colonel
Michael Negard, “Schoomaker: Army Must Fight in 4 Quadrants,”
Army News Service, November 22, 2005.
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“Balance” thus cannot mean simultaneous maximum proficiency at everything—this is impossible. And
balance in the manner of real pentathletes, who accept
less-than-maximum performance in each component
event in order to avoid catastrophic weakness in any
one of them, has not been the U.S. military’s choice for
at least the last 30 years of its history. On the contrary,
the U.S. military’s recent tradition has been closer
to that of a single-event specialist (and gold medal
winner, as it were) in modern-system major warfare.
Transformation advocates, effectively, propose a
different choice of single-event specialization, but it is
not possible to do this without reducing performance
for the old event. There is no such thing as a military
that can be simultaneously ideal for all opponent
types.159
159. Similar questions have been debated in Israel since
the 1990s, and this debate has yielded a sizeable literature. See,
e.g., Sergio Catignani, Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas:
Dilemmas of a Conventional Army, New York: Routledge, 2008;
Martin van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History
of the Israeli Defence Force, New York: Public Affairs, 1998; Stuart
A. Cohen, Israel and its Army: Continuity and Change, New York:
Routledge, 2008; Emanuel Wald, The Wald Report: The Decline of
Israeli National Security Since 1967, Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1992; Stuart A. Cohen, “The Israel Defense Force: Continuity and
Change,” in Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney eds., Armed
Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy, London: Frank
Cass, 2002; Eliot Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, Andrew Bacevich,
Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel’s Security Revolution, Washington,
DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998; Uri BarJoseph, ed., Israel’s National Security Towards the 21st Century, New
York: Routledge, 2001; Clive Jones, “Israeli Counter-Insurgency
Strategy and the War in South Lebanon, 1985-97,” Small Wars and
Insurgencies, Vol. 8, No. 3, Winter 1997, pp. 82-108; Gabriel BenDor, Ami Pedahzur, and Badi Hasisi, “Israel’s National Security
Doctrine under Strain: The Crisis of the Reserve Army,” Armed
Forces & Society, Vol. 28, No. 2, Winter 2002, pp. 233-255. For
discussions of how Israeli defense policy has reflected this debate
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This, however, poses serious challenges for U.S.
policy makers in light of the tension between the
implications of the 2006 Lebanon campaign and the
demands of Iraq and Afghanistan. Ongoing operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan demand maximum capability
for defeating current enemies who practice a close
approximation of classical guerrilla warfare; Lebanon
suggests a possibility for future enemies who could
wage war more conventionally than this. The different
demands of these different styles of fighting thus leave
defense planners with a dilemma: the United States
cannot simultaneously maximize its potential for both,
but neither prospect can safely be ignored, requiring a
painful choice in which something important must be
sacrificed whichever choice one makes.
By contrast, many in today’s future warfare debate
see a simpler, less conflicted picture. It is now widely
argued that the future is one of nonstate opponents
who will use asymmetric, irregular methods much
like those of today’s Iraqi or Afghan insurgents. If
so, then there is little or no real, meaningful risk in
transforming the U.S. military around the needs of
in recent years, see, e.g., Ben David, “Extensive Cuts to Hit Israeli
Ground Forces the Most,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 16, 2003;
Ben-David, “All Quiet on the Eastern Front, so Israel will Revise
IDF Organization and Doctrine,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March
1, 2004; Ben-David, “Israel Set to Restructure Ground Forces,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 10, 2004; Ben-David, “Israel’s LowIntensity Conflict Doctrine,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 1,
2004; Catignani, “Israel Defence Forces Organizational Changes
in an Era of Budgetary Cutbacks,” RUSI Journal, October 2004,
pp. 72-76; Ben-David, “Debriefing Teams Brand IDF Doctrine
‘Completely Wrong’”; Ben-David, “Israel Reflects—New Model
Army?”; Ben-David, “IDF Shifts Focus to Ground Forces,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, January 10, 2007; Ben-David, “IDF Unveils FiveYear Plan to Boost Capabilities,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September
12, 2007; Allison Krant, “Multi-Year Plan to Strengthen IDF
Conventional Capabilities,” JINSA Online, November 12, 2007.
86

the guerrilla end of the behavioral spectrum. On the
contrary, this would unambiguously improve U.S.
national security by reshaping the military to meet the
real needs of the future, finally shedding the inherited
baggage of a Cold War force whose bureaucratic
inertia had thwarted needed change until now. The
particular policy agenda associated with this view is
diametrically opposite the Rumsfeld transformation
program, but perhaps ironically it shares Rumsfeld’s
frustration with the perceived inertia and apparently
old-fashioned thinking of the institutional military
and its defenders of conventional war making capacity, and it shares Rumsfeld’s insistence on transformational change in light of this. If the future really is
one of nonstate actors waging an information-age
version of classical guerrilla warfare, then the lowtech transformation agenda is an unambiguous good,
and the defense planning challenge of today and
tomorrow is a politically demanding but intellectually
straightforward matter of pushing hard enough to get
a resistant bureaucracy to do the right thing and accept
as much irregular warfare transformation as it can be
made to swallow.
The Lebanon experience, however, suggests a
future of less clarity and more diversity. Lebanon in
2006 shows us a concrete example of a nonstate actor
whose military behavior was far from the classical
guerrilla model seen in today’s Iraq and Afghanistan.
And Hezbollah in 2006 is unlikely to be the last of
these—other nonstate actors elsewhere appear to be
adopting similarly rightward positions on Figure 1’s
taxonomy of military behavior. It cannot yet be known
how broad this trend may be, what its root causes are,
or how far it will go—to answer these questions is a
critical research requirement for the defense intellec-
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tual community today. But Hezbollah does demonstrate, unambiguously, that even today’s nonstate actors are not limited to the irregular, guerrilla-model
military methods so often assumed in the future
warfare debate.
And this means that today’s defense planning
challenge is more complex than the current debate often
implies. There are real risks both in changing too little
and in changing too much. And to avert failure in Iraq
or Afghanistan may require a real sacrifice in meeting
future challenges elsewhere that cannot be avoided
by ignoring conventional threats or by insisting on
balance. The tradeoffs are real, they are not artificial,
and the dilemmas they create cannot be ducked.
This certainly does not mean that the United States
should return to a preclusive focus on major warfare as
it did before 2003—or that a Hezbollah threat should
replace the Red Army in the Fulda Gap as the focus
for U.S. defense planning. Single-event (or singlethreat) specialization in a world where we could face
multiple events (or multiple threats) is dangerous
whichever event one would choose. The pre-2003 U.S.
military was very close to this degree of specialization
for modern-system enemies; while it enjoyed more
residual capability against other foes than an RMA
force would have, this residual proved inadequate
against the guerrilla opposition we faced increasingly
beginning in 2004. And it would be dangerous and
unwise to return to the pre-2003 focus and accept the
degree of unpreparedness for guerrilla methods this
produced.
Nor does this analysis imply that we should accept
failure in Iraq or Afghanistan so as to rebalance the
military toward more conventional enemies than we
face there. Failure in either Iraq or Afghanistan could
have grave consequences for U.S. national interests.
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Until these theaters are stabilized—or unless stability
becomes infeasible—it will be essential to maximize U.S.
performance in these ongoing wars even if this reduces
future potential for some as-yet unseen war elsewhere. The
analysis of Lebanon above thus does not presuppose
appropriate U.S. policy for Iraq or Afghanistan.160
What an analysis of Lebanon can do, however,
is to show the limits of some prominent analyses of
future warfare and to highlight the true dilemmas
associated with defense policy decisionmaking. The
future is not simply one of guerrilla-like warfare by
nonstate actors. And this means that a thoroughgoing
transformation to suit the demands of such warfare has
real risks and real dangers as well as benefits. It may
still be the right policy to shift the U.S. military’s focus
160. In particular, while policy failure in a future conflict
against a conventionally capable nonstate actor would be bad,
failure in Iraq or Afghanistan could be worse; it might simply be
necessary to pay the price in military preparedness for an unknown
future in order to avoid failure in a known present. In general, the
problem of U.S. policy in Iraq and Afghanistan has long been one
of picking the least-bad option from among an unattractive menu
of choices. And like everything else about Iraq and Afghanistan,
the problem of designing the military that will wage these wars,
and also meet other threats elsewhere, is one of balancing costs
and risks on all sides of the ledger. What Lebanon in 2006 shows
is that these costs and risks are indeed real: even nonstate enemies
will not necessarily limit themselves to irregular warfare. For a
more detailed discussion of the dilemmas of policy choice in
Iraq, see Stephen Biddle, “Stabilizing Iraq from the Bottom Up,”
Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate, Second Session, 110th Congress, April 2, 2008; idem,
“Patient Stabilized?” The National Interest, March/April 2008, pp.
19-25; idem, “Evaluating Options for Partial Withdrawals from
Iraq,” Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations in Alternatives for
Iraq, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, July
25, 2007.
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toward guerrilla warfare, especially relative to the pre2003 military’s radical avoidance of this problem. It
may even be the right policy to make a radical shift
toward counterguerrilla proficiency if this is the only
way to avoid defeat in such wars. Or it may not: an
analysis of Lebanon per se cannot establish how much
counterguerrilla capability is enough. But to make this
decision requires a sound understanding of the costs—
as well as the benefits—of all the options. And a true
reoptimization of the military for classical guerrilla
warfare would entail real costs in a world where
Hezbollah-like enemies may become more common
over time. There is no escaping this tradeoff via a
simple projection of a monolithic future threat, and one
need not necessarily be a bureaucratic obstructionist to
worry about non-guerrilla enemies. What Hezbollah
in 2006 shows is that in defense planning, as in
economics, there is no such thing as a free lunch or an
unambiguous, risk-free policy. The real world is one of
tradeoffs, and all options have downsides—even the
options that look most forward-thinking.
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